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As a precaution against excessive and arbitrary rule, the Constitu-
tion provided each branch with the means of controlling, to some extent, 
each of the other branches. In addition, each branch was further divided: 
the Congress was divided into two houses, the federal courts were divid-
ed into the Supreme Court and inferior courts, and the executive was to 
consist of a president and vice president. These internal divisions in 
the three branches have provided additional 11 checks 11 on the government, 
except in the case of the executive branch. In fact, although it is com-
mon to describe the president and vice president as the top executives in 
the United States government, there is considerable doubt about the accu-
racy of this description. 
A Member of the Executive Branch? 
Article I of the Constitution outlines the legislative branch of the 
gave rnment. It is in this article that one of the two constitutional 
duties of the vice president is discussed. Article I, Section 3, clause 4 
states: 11 The Vice President of the United States shall be President of 
the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided. 111 The 
only other constitutional duty mentioned is that pertaining to succession 
and disability in Article II. 
2 
In expressing his opinion on Adams• refusal to invite him to cabinet 
meetings, Vice President Jefferson once said, 11 1 consider my office as 
constitutionally confiried to legislative functions, and that I could not 
2 take part whatever in executive consultations, even were it proposed. 11 
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower also believed that the vice presidemt 
was not a member of the executive branch. 3 Donald Young, a respected 
scholar of the vice presidency, agrees. He writes, 11Technically, then, 
he [Vice President] was to be a member of the legislative branch.•• 4 Even 
though he presided over cabinet meetings (the first vice president to do 
so), Vice President Marshall regard~d himself as a member of the legisla-
tive branch.5 The status of the vice president as a member of the legis-
lative branch rather than the ~xecutive branch was clearly stated during 
congressional hearings in 1956 concerning a proposed administrati~e vice 
president. The first person to testify at that hearing was former Presi-
dent Hoover. The following exchange concerning the status of the vice 
president takes place between Senator McClellan (D-Arkansas) and Mr. 
Hoover: 
Senator McClellan: Today he is in the legislative branch of 
the Government, and, ... he performs very 1 ittle duties in that 
capacity .... does seem to me that the office of Vice Presi-
dent of the United States should be related to the executive 
branch of the Government where the Vice President, in the per-
formance of functions that might be assigned to him in that 
branch of the Government, would become equipped from experi-
ence and direct contact with the problems involved to assume 
the duties of the Presidency in the event a vacancy should oc-
cur. 
Mr. Hoover: My only comment, Senator, is if you were going to 
do that, that you would have to make the Vice President appoint-
ed by the President. 
Senator McClellan: am not proposing any particular method, 
but it does seem to me that the Vice President really belongs in 
the executive branch of the Government.6 
3 
In this discussion both appear to agree on one point, and that is that the 
vice president is not a member of the executive branch. Clark Clifford, 
former special assistant to President Truman, later testified and gave 
his opinion about the status of the Vice President. He stated: "I be-
lieve that the Vice President could be moved from the legislative branch, 
where he now is, to the executive branch. It would take a constitutional 
amendment. 117 Inserted into the record of these hearings was a large or-
ganizational chart labeled "Executive Branch of the Government" (Figure 
I). The office of the vice president does not appear on that chart. As 
recently as 1978, the National Journal was referring to the vice presiden-
cy as a "hybrid office. 118 After noting that vice presidents are often 
confused as to the behavior expected of them, the Journal states: "Neither 
are Vice Presidents helped by the Constitution,which only vaguely defines 
their duties and leaves unclear whether they are members of the legisla-
tive or executive branch."9 The United States Governmental Manual, which 
describes itself.as the official handbook of the federal government, did 
not I ist the Vice President in its organizational chart of the United 
States government until the 1981/82 edition. Instead the vice president 
appears in the organization chart of the United States Senate. A small 
box on that chart states, "This chart seeks to show only.the more impor-
• II JQ tant agenc1es. 
Where does this leave the vice p~esident? Gerald Ford, when Vice 
President, described the office as "a constitutional hybrid ... with 
one foot in the legislative branch and the other in the executive ... 
I I 
He belongs both to the President and to Congress." Ford 1 s comments 
give additional credence to the argument that there is confusion over the 
actual location of the vice presidency in the national government. 
The President 
Executive Office of 
the Pr sident 
Multi-Head d Agencies 
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government 
Operations, Administrative Vice President, 
Hearings, Before the Subcommittee on Reorganiz-
ation, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., 1956, p. 69. 
Figure l. Executive Branch of Government 
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Consider also the following quotes, all of which appear in the same recent 
article on the vice presidency: 
The vice-presidency is now very much a part of the executive 
branch and the presidential establishment. 
Another paradox is that technically a vice-president is neither 
a part of the executive branch nor subject to the direction of 
the president. 
As matters now stand, a vice-president is a full member of 
neither branch. 12 
Ford suggests the Vice President belongs to both; however, a more accurate 
description would be that he belongs to neither. The importance of this 
description lies in the fact that the many criticisms leveled against the 
vice presidency system stem from this peculiar relationship. 
Literature Review 
One of the criticisms made about research on the presidency is the 
anecdotal nature of such research. Entire articles in scholarly journals 
have pleaded for more systematic research on the chief executive. If 
there is a tendency to emphasize anecdotal material in studying the presi-
dency, the tendency is even stronger in studies of the vice presidency. 
Almost every book on the vice presidency devotes an introductory chapter 
to the development of the office and a concluding chapter on the need for 
reform. Sandwiched betv11een these are chapters detailing the history of 
the vice presidency. Thes'e chapters are usually little more than bio-
graphical sketches of each vice president. Any analysis, if present in 
these books, tends to revolve around the selection process for the vice 
president, which is the favorite topic of most of the authors. 
One such book is American Roulette by Donald Young. Young gives a 
historical account of the selection of every vice president, up to and 
6 
including Spiro Agnew. There is very little analysis provided in these 
seventeen chapters except for the periodic references to the 11 balancing 
the ticket 11 strategy. He concludes that presidents should continue to 
have the authority to select their running mates and that 11balancing the 
ticket•• (with the exception of political philosophy) is proper. He also 
speculates that in future presidential elections 11 • • young, relatively 
unknown men wi 11 see Vice-Presidential nominations, even on tickets they 
expect may lose, in order to obtain national exposure.•• 13 As another con-
sideration of the election procedure, he endorses the 11 package dea1' 1 which 
prevents voters from expressing a separate vote for president and vice 
. d 14 pres1 ent. Young believes that the problems with the vice presidency 
are basically a reflection of problems with the government in general. He 
does not, therefore, think that any major overhaul such as a constitution-
al amendment enumerating specific powers of the office or attempting to 
upgrade it is necessary. His boldest recommendation is that we write in-
to the Constitution: 11The Vice President shall serve the President in 
such administrative capacity as the latter may deem appropriate.•• 15 
A book which is dissimilar to Young 1 s is Edgar Waugh 1 s Second Coun-
16 
sul. This book is not a collection of vice presidential biographies, 
although the careers of certain vice presidents are detailed. Waugh is 
more interested in what the vice presidency has contributed, rather than 
what any single vice president has contr~buted, to the government. His 
conclusion is that the vice presidency has been a monumental failure. 
Waugh 1 s solution is to remove the vice president from the Senate and make 
him first assistant to the president. He does, however, consider other 
11 reforms 11 with an analysis of what the results of each might be. 
7 
A noted scholar of the vice presidency, Irving G. Williams, pub! ish-
ed a book on the vice presidency in 1956. Williams• book is highly bio-
graphical, but does shed important 1 ight (as wil 1 be discussed in the 
next chapter) on the creation and election of the vice presidency as de-
signed by the delegates at the Constitutional Convention. Wi !Iiams notes 
in his preface that he wrote the book ••to close a serious gap intheliter-
ature ... for .. there are only two other volumes which treat the vice-
presidency as a whole.•• 17 This fact in itself is something of a commen-
tary on the activity of past vice presidents. Williams believesthatmost 
of the nineteenth century vice presidents were unimportant men who helped 
to shape the vice presidency into an unimportant office. With the twenti-
eth century, however, the importance of the vice presidency increases so 
that in writing about Vice President Nixon he describes the office as one 
17 of responsibility and power, 
Two years earlier Professor Williams published a monograph on the 
vice presidency which is much more concise, but much more analytical in 
its study of the office. In that study he condemns the selection method 
for vice presidential candidates. He blames the historical demise of the 
office on the selection process and warns that any attempt to reform the 
office wi 11 be for naught unless the selection process is first improved. 
One reform he does advocate is making the vice president an administra-
tive assistant to the vice president. 
Another book devoted to biographies of each vice president (up to 
A d 1 ) . s 1 B I d G . 18 Walter hon a e IS o arzman s Madness an en1uses. Each biography 
is about six pages long and there is very little analysis or interpretive 
analysis in the book. He does, however, in his epilogue, discuss his 
interpretat1ons of why the vice presidency is in need of reform. His 
8 
conclusions are almost identical to Williams' except that he reverses the 
priority. First, he argues the office must be given important duties. 
Given these, the problem of selection of good personnel to fill the office 
should correct itself. The only viable alternative, in Barzman's opinion, 
is to amend the Constitution to delegate specific powers to the vice 
president. 
A whole body of literature is devoted to presidential succession. 
Some of the leading books include the following: Feerick's From Failing 
Hands, Si lva 1 s Presidential Succession, Cohen and Witcover's A Heartbeat 
Away, and Shannon's The Heir Apparent. 19 Because of the ratification of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, most of these books are dated and serve only 
as histories to the office and past successions. One early book that is 
particularly good at providing a history and sketching the development 
and ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is Bayh's One Heartbeat 
20 
Away. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary's subcommittee on Constitu-
tiona] Amendments (which had jurisdiction over the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment), Bayh serves as participant observer in this landmark development. 
Two books that followed that amendment are Sindler•s Unchosen Presidents 
and Feerick's The Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 21 The subject of these books 
will be discussed in Chapter IV which is devoted to reforming the selec-
tion of the vice president, and Chapter VI on presidential selection. 
Scholarly articles on the vice presidency have also appeared from 
time to time. As with books, these have tended to be devoted to a cur-
rent issue (in most cases succession or disability, or both) and thus 
are clustered around such events. One early article that raised serious 
questions about retaining the office was written by Senator Beveridge 
from Indiana. The article, which appeared in Century Magazine, cal led 
the vice president a ''fifth wheel" in our government and "a Queen Bee 
kept in reserve."22 To increase the prestige of the office, Senator 
Beveridge proposed giving the vice president the power to appoint Sena-
tors to the standing committees. In 1953, an article appeared in the 
9 
Political Science Quarterly which argued that it was impossible to solve 
the dilemma of the vice presidency (get presidential timber to accept an 
"empty" Job). 23 The author concludes that one way to improve the situa-
tion would be to have "special elections" when a vice president succeeds. 
The way to solve the problem, however, would be to abolish the office. 
This was not the first time, nor was it the last, that someone has pro-
posed this, but it was one of the first such articles to appear in a rna-
jor political journal. Since then the champion for abolishing the vice 
presidency has been Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. He advocated this in an ap-
pendix to his book, The Imperial Presidency. 24 His arguments in that 
book will be discussed in a later chapter. Another article published in 
Political Science Quarterly was written by a well-known political scien-
tist noted for his writings on the presidency: Clinton L. Rossiter. 
Rossiter's article is devoted to reforming the vice presidency. He con-
siders abolishing the office as one alternative but concludes that this 
is undesirable. His list of reforms is quite extensive. They include 
the following: 






Enact new statutes and amend old ones shifting administra-
tive duties from the president to the vice president 
Designate the vice president as the president's chief 
assistant 
Give the vice president the authority to sign the presi-
dent's name 
Create an Executive Office of the Vice President 
Require the Vice President to be a member of the presi-
dent's Cabinet 
Phase out the vice president's role of 'President of the 
Senate. '25 
10 
Since the publication of this article in 1948, none of these reforms has 
been acted upon. 
In 1967, David published an article on the vice presidency in The 
Journal of Politics. 26 This article differed significantly from previ-
ous ones in its conspicuous lack of reform suggestions. David 1 s article 
was a description of the vice presidential terms of Richard Nixon, Lyndon 
Johnson, and Hubert Humphrey. Based on personal observation and inter-
views with leaders in government, David comes up with the following pro-
positions: 
(1) The Vice Presidency is in transition to a new institutional 
status in which it will be recognized as an office estab-
lished predominantly in the Executive Branch, while retain-
ing its constitutional prerogatives in the Legislative 
Branch. 
(2) Future Vice Presidents can be expected to serve routinely 
as deputy chiefs of state and deputy leaders of their na-
tional political party; to be available for service at any 
time as deputy to the Pres1dent in the field of foreign af-
fairs; to receive many ad hoc administrative and legisla-
tive assignments; to continue to accumulate a set of con-
tinuing functions in the Executive Branch; and to serve 
from time to time as Acting President under the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment. 
(3) The increasing recognition of the Vice Presidency reflects 
the hazards of the present world situation, in which the 
Vice President may be called upon at any time to take over 
as commander-in-chief, as well as the growing burdens on 
the time and strength of the President as chief executive, 
leader of his political party, and chief of state. 
(4) The functions, duties, and prerogatives of the Vice Presi-
dent as a member of the Executive Branch are not likely to 
be expanded except with the formal or informal concurrence 
of the President; but once such functions, duties, and pre-
rogatives are in place, withdrawal through action by the 
President becomes more difficult than their initial estab-
lishment. 
(5) The Vice Presidency is rapidly achieving a status in which 
a typical incumbent will be the most likely next presiden-
tial nominee of the party in power whenever the President 
himself is unavailable, if this transformation has not in 
fact ?lready occurred mainly as a result of the Twenty-
Second Amendment. 
(6) Most of the changes previously noted would have been diffi-
cult or impossible, despite other causal factors, if the 
winning presidential nominees of recent years had not been 
permitted to control the selection of the vice-presiden-
tial nominee on the same ticket. 
(7) The office of Vice President of the United States is pre-
sumably the most important 'second man position' in the 
world, but it is still a 'second man position,' with char-
acteristics of ambiguity, personal self-denial, and psycho-
logical insecurity that are inherent in some degree in all 
such positions. 
(8) Despite these characteristics and as long as present trends 
continue, there will be no lack of able candidates for the 
vice presidential nomination on any prospectively winning 
national party ticket.27 
11 
Thomas E. Cronin, a political scientist who is a leading scholar on 
the Presidency, has recently published an article on the vice presiden-
28 cy. He traces the growth of the office including, in his analysis, 
the Mondale vice presidency. He concludes that "Mondale's Model" has 
added prestige to the office and that Bush should continue this trend. 
Concerning the various proposals for reform, Cronin stresses the selec-
tion process rather than substantive or institutional matters. Given 
the proper personnel, Cronin believes that the vice presidency can be a 
useful training ground for future presidents. 
Design of Study 
A review of the literature on the vice presidency demonstrates the 
three areas of· emphasis: biographical studies, reform of the vice presi-
dency (usually with an emphasis on vice presidential selection), and 
presidential succession and disability. The tendency for studies of the 
vice presidency to concentrate on these areas is understandable given 
the few constitutional duties assigned to the office. Historians have 
paid more attention to the office than political scientists and both 
have devoted most of their research to the vice presidents and not the 
vice presidency. As such, few analytical studies have been done on the 
12 
office. This has left a serious gap in what is now considered to be by 
many an important political office. To set the stage for such analysis, 
Chapter I I will trace the history of the vice presidency. This histori-
cal review will clarify and explain the development of the vice presiden-
cy. This history is important in that not only does it provide one with 
the background for putting the vice presidency into proper perspective, 
it rejects some myths concerning the office (such as the reason for its 
creation). 
Chapter II concludes with a question. Has the vice presidency de-
veloped into an important office? If the answer is yes, then perhaps 
the office should be retained in its present form. The Carter-Mondale 
team is cited by some as the turning point in this development. Until 
several administrations come and go, it will be uncertain whether this 
is true or not. Yet, other reasons, independent of the Carter-Mondale 
relationship, exist for retaining the vice presidency. First, there is 
the argument that the vice president is the most appropriate to succeed 
to the presidency because he and the president are the only two individ-
uals which have all the voters of the United States as their constituen-
cy. Chapter I I I examines the validity of this argument. While it is 
true that the president and vice president represent the nation, the 
question remains, 11 Do voters in fact cast a vote for a presidential 
ticket on the basis of the vice presidential candidate? 11 This chapter 
also examines the related question of the home state strategy. 
Chapter IV examines the various proposals for reforming the elec-
tion or selection of the vice president. The findings from the previous 
chapter, along with important constraints re~ognized in the literature, 
are applied to these reforms. 
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A second argument for retaining the vice presidency is that it 
serves as a good apprenticeship or understudy for the presidency. This 
argument is discussed and its validity questioned in Chapter V. Addi-
tional questions addressed in this chapter are: (1) Has there been any 
significant improvement made in the caliber of individuals selected as 
vice president in this century? (2) Do higher rated presidents tend to 
select higher rated vice presidents? And (3) Do higher rated vice presi-
dents, upon becoming president, tend to be higher rated presidents? 
Chapter VI discusses that area of the vice presidency that is given 
considerable attention by many other authors--presidential succession. 
The discussion uses as its focal point the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which 
happens to be the most recent constitutional development pertaining to 
the vice presidency. What impact has this amendment had on the develop-
ment of the office? Advocates of the amendment believed that it was 
needed because of the increasing importance of the office. What were 
they trying to achieve when wriUng this amendment and did they achieve 
it? Of particular importance is the question of the desirabi.l ity of a 
caretaker regime, because several reforms proposed for the vice presiden-
cy (including abolishment) are criticized for creating caretaker execu-
tives. Chapter VI concludes with a discussion of the possible effects 
of this situation. 
Chapter VI I summarizes the findings of the other chapters and pre-
sents the overall conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY 
The vice presidency to a very great degree is a legacy of history. 
Of major significance for the forming of the vice presidency were six fac-
tors: (1) colonial governments; (2) early state governments; (3) crea-
tion of the vice presidency; (4) John Adams, the first Vice President; 
(5) the Twelfth Amendment; and (6) the effects of other amendments. In 
this chapter each of these factors shall be considered in turn. 
Colonial Governments 
It is probable that the vice presidency 1 s prototype was the 1 ieuten-
ant governor. The title 11 lieutenant governor, 11 however, had several dif-
ferent meanings in colonial times. Before discussing those different 
meanings, a brief sketch of colonial governments is in order. 
There were basically three types of colonies: proprietary, royal, 
and charter. Only two states were of the charter type, and any general-
izations about colonial government would normally exempt these two. Most 
colonial governments consisted of a chief executive and a bicameral legis-
lature. One house (usually referred to during that time as the 11 upper 
house 11 ) was comprised of the governor 1 s council. These were a group of 
men (usually 12) who had three duties: 
The counci 1 was a unique institution in its power and composi-
tion. It served in a threefold capacity with executive, legis-
lative, and judicial duties. It was the governor 1 s advisory 
16 
boa~d, the upper house of the assembly, and the highest court 
of appeals in the province. l 
17 
The governor in royal colonies was a representative of the king (in-
directly this was true in proprietary colonies). 
The duties of the governor were extensive and his powers almost 
dangerously great. As direct representative of his royal mas-
ter he was naturally endowed with prerogatives which in Great 
Britain belonged solely to the king.2 
The title of lieutenant governor was used in colonial governments in three 
different ways: 
l. governor 
2. deputy to proprietor 
3. lieutenant governor (as in contemporary usage). 
Labarce notes that the official title for colonial governors included 
"lieutenant and governor general" and 11 1 ieutenant governor and commander 
in chief. 113 In proprietary colonies the "actual" governor (the propri-
etor was the top authority when present in the colony) was often called 
1 • b h d h • I l" 4 1eutenant governor ecause e serve as t e proprietor s 1eutenant. 
It was the third meaning of lieutenant governor that serves as a proto-
type to contemporary lieutenant governor and the vice presidency of the 
United States. This meaning refers to the lieutenant governor as the 
governor's successor. "By this term is here meant an officer named to 
exercise all the powers granted to the governor on the latter's death or 
absence from the province. 115 The title given to this person, in addition 
to lieutenant governor, included "deputy governor," "vice director," and 
"vice president. 116 The lieutenant governor was usually an~ officio 
member of the council, usually senior councilor. As such he served as a 
replacement for the governor, who in early colonial history, had himself 
presided over the council when it metas the "upper house" of the assembly. 
18 
The history of the colonial lieutenant governor helps, in several 
ways, to explain the creation and evolution of the vice presidency. First, 
it is clear that the 1 ieutenant governor 1 s most important role was acting 
as governor when a vacancy occurred or when the governor was ab·sent from 
the colony. Second, the constitutional duty given the vice president to 
preside over the Senate is clearly a continuation of a similar duty given 
most 1 ieutenant governors. Third, the manner in which conflicts between 
governors and 1 ieutenant governors were resolved may have helped establish 
the vice president as a weak officer of the government. The following ex-
amples illustrate this point: 
1. For periods of time the crown experimented with having the 
same person as governor of more than one colony. This caus-
ed some confusion as to the status of the lieutenant gover-
nor of a particular colony when such a governor was not 
physically present in that colony. The question arose dur-
ing the tenure of Edward Hyde, Lord Cornbury, as governor 
of both New York and New Jersey. As Cornbury spent most of 
his time in New York, it was suggested that the lieutenant 
governor of New Jersey, Colonel lngoldsby, should act in 
Cornbury 1 s absence. Cornbury, however, was of a different 
op1n1on. He held to the view that when he was in New York, 
he was to be regarded as legally present in both colonies. 
Since Cornbury was a strong individual, he prevailed in the 
struggle. 
2. Unt i 1 1741 these co 1 on i es (Massachusetts and New Hampshire) 
had the same governor and he usually resided in Boston. In 
1703 Lieutenant Governor John Usher of Massachusetts sought 
to remove some civil and military officials for disloyalty 
to the crown and incompetency. He wrote to the governor, 
Joseph Dudley, who resided in Boston, for authority to make 
the removals. Dudley suggested that Usher act cautiously, 
remarking that 1where there are so few persons fit for pub-
lic business we must.drive as we can. 1 Usher subsequently 
attempted to remove one Captain Hincks. Dudley replied to 
Usher that he would sign all commissions. Dudley further 
stated that any request he had to make would reach Usher 
within twenty-four hours. The perplexed Usher complained 
to the authorities in England, declaring that his commis-
sion was a mere cipher, that the position of lieutenant 
governor meant nothing, and that he was seldom consulted by 
Dudley concerning New Hampshire. Usher 1 s complaints, how-
ever, were to no avail. 
3. Lieutenant Governor George Vaughan, a resident of New Hamp-
shire, had acted as governor for a year before [Governor] 
Shute's arrival in the colony. Vaughan took the position 
that he was to act as governor whenever the governor was 
absent from New Hampshire. Shute disagreed, stating that 
he was legal Jy present in both New Hampshire and Massachu-
setts when present in either. Vaughan brought the matter 
to a head by acting in disregard to Shute's orders and by 
suspending one of the counsilors. Thereupon, Shute re-
turned to New Hampshire and suspended Vaughan. The suspen-
sion was approved by the assembly.? 
Early State Governments 
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Following the declaring of independence, the colonies began the pro-
cess of transforming themselves into states. This entailed the writing 
of state constitutions in the tradition of colonial charters and the the-
ory of limited government. Of the original thirteen colonies, six had 
some form of lieutenant governor in their original state constitutions 
(see Table I). Of the remaining states, three created the office of lieu-
tenant governor with the first revision of their constitution, and two 
created the office in the 1860's. Georgia created the office of I ieutenant 
governor in 1945 and two of the original thirteen states have never had 
lieutenant governors. 
The rationale for creation of the office of lieutenant governor in 
the states was basically the same one that existed in colonial govern-
ments: to provide for a successor. When evaluating the office of lieu-
tenant governor it is this function that is usually.singled out. Thus, 
one author writes: 
It seems 1 ikely that the office of Governor, over the years, 
has been ... undergirded by the peacefully smooth success ion 
to office resulting from the existence of the office of Li~u­
tenant Governor when the Governor departs from his office.u 
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1The title of 11 Vice President11 was used. 
2 
Under the original state constitution the president of the privy 
council was the 1 i eutenant governor. In 1830, the senior member on the 
Council of State was 1 ieutenant governor. 
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is taken, serious study would have to be made of the question of succes-
sion to the governorship. 9 
New York 1 s constitutional provision for the office served as a model 
for the United States vice presidency. 10 In that state a lieutenant gov-
ernor, who served ex officio as the presiding officer of the state senate, 
was elected by popular vote in the same way as the governor. This may ex-
plain why so many arguments for reforming or abolishing the vice presiden-
cy coincide with the same arguments for the office of lieutenant governor. 
Creation of the Vice Presidency 
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 had all the 
political experiences of the colonies and states to rely on for helping 
them devise a new government. Using these was helpful in establishing 
some parts of the Constitution, but the delegates came up with some inno-
vations of.their own. The delegates are usually seen as characterizing 
two extremes: benevolent phi losphers or wealthy opportunists. A good 
case can b d h h . h 11 e mae tat t ey were ne1t er. That the Constitution con-
tains so many compromises indicates the delegates were not the idealists 
described in many school textbooks. Idealists, by definition, do not com-
promise. Some of the compromises struck at Philadelphia were to bring 
disagreeing factions together, while others were struck in anticipation 
of the ratification process. Some were more direct than others. The com-
promise to establish a Congress in which 11 people11 and ••states•• were repre-
sented was direct, but it indirectly resulted in the creation of a bicam-
era! legislature (even though the first national government, under the 
Articles of Confederation, had a unicameral Congress). The creation of 
the vice presidency was this kind of indirect compromise. 
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Because of the history of the office of lieutenant governor, the 
office of vice president is often viewed as solving (or helping to solve) 
the problem of succession. Thus, one author of a book on the vice presi-
dency writes: 
Yet , if we consider the full significance of the vice presiden-
tial office, its raison d 1 etre is to provide, when necessary, con-
tinuity in the presidential succession through a fully qualified 
successor .... He should be the person who, next to the presi-
dential candidate, is deemed best able to meet the complex and 
increasingly exacting requirements of the American Chief Execu-
tive. This was what the framers of the Constitution envisaged.l 2 
In fact, creation of the office was tied to the debate over the election 
of a president rather than the concerns over succession (the succession 
provision is discussed in Chapter IV). 
There were four basic proposals proposed by the Convention for elect-
ing the president: (1) by Congress, (2) by the state legislatures, (3) 
direct election, and (4) indirect election by electors. On July 25, Madi-
son made the following comment pertaining to election of the president: 
11The election must be made either by some existing authority under the na-
tiona] or state constitution--or by some special authority derived from 
the people--or by the people themselves. 1113 There was much discussion, 
during the summer, over these four possible methods of election. Corwin 
states, 110n no other problem did the Convention expend more time and 
14 
effort. 11 The delegates had, at one point, unanimously approved of Con-
gress electing the president. Later in the Convention this method was 
rejected for the elector system. Gouverneur Morris articulated his, and 
no doubt other delegates 1 , concern with the Congress electing the presi-
dent: 
Our Country is an extensive one. We must either then renounce 
the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with suffi-
cient vigor to pervade every part of it.. One great object 
of the Executive is to control the Legislature. The Legisla-
ture will continually seek to aggrandise and perpetuate them-
selves; and will seize those critical moments produced by war, 
invasion, or convulsion for that purpose. It is necessary. 
then that the Executive Magistrate should be the guardian of 
the people .... If he is to be the Guardian of the people let 
him be appointed by the people. 15 
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Later on, the delegates reversed themselves and once again opted for elec-
tion by Congress. When, however, the Committee on Postponed Matters and 
Unfinished Business (the so-called "Committee of El~ven") gave its sup-
port on September 4, the elector method was the election method proposed 
rather than the election by Congress. Why the change? 
There were three reasons for this change. First, there was the afore-
mentioned concern expressed by Gouverneur Morris that if elected by Con-
gress the president would not be an independent officer. Second, there 
was a great deal of concern that if Congress elected the president, the 
process would consistently be affected by cabal and foreign influence. 
Third, the proposal to let Congress elect the president also specified 
that the president would be ineligible for a second term. 16 
What were the objections to direct election? One point working 
against the direct election method was not so much an objection, but more 
an omission that made it less attractive than election by electors. "The 
electoral method had the additional advantage that it left each state 
free to determine its own rule of suffrage without sacrificing its due 
weight in the choice of a President. 1117 Some delegates objectedtodirect 
election on the grounds that the public was too ignorant to select a presi-
dent. The following quotation of Gerry, a staunch opponent to direct 
election, exemplifies this objection: 
A popular election in this case is radically VICIOUS. The ig-
norance of the people would put it in the power of some one set 
of men dispersed through the UniQn and acting in concert to de-
lude them into any appointment.lH 
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A third, and not insignificant, objection to direct election was the ad-
vantage it would give the most populous states. This method would, it 
was thought, discriminate against southern states, because of the smaller 
population in these states and the fact that the population was further 
diluted by disenfranchised slaves. Mr. \.Jilliamson proposed a solution to 
this problem on July 25, as recorded in Madison 1 s journal: 
The principal objection against an election by the people seem-
ed to be, the disadvantage under which it would place the small-
er States. He suggested as a cure for this difficulty, that 
each man should vote for 3 candidates. One of these he observed 
would be probably of his own state, the other 2 of some other 
States; and as probably of a smaller or a large one. l9 
Gouverneur Morris 1 iked this idea but suggested the number of votes be 
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changed from three to two. 
The electoral system partially remedied these problems in that small 
states would be given two electoral votes regardless of the population of 
their state. Sti 11, the objection concerning large states versus small 
states which had been made against direct election had also been made 
21 against the electoral system. This seemingly resulted in a partial 
fusion of the idea of direct election and electoral vote and resulted in 
the constitutional provision giving each elector two votes. 
After the Committee of Eleven introduced the idea of a vice presi-
dent there were several objections voiced against the idea. In voicing 
his objections, Mr. Williamson alluded to why the Committee of Eleven had 
proposed the office in the first place. II . an officer as vice-presi-
dent was not wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable 
mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same time. 1122 
There is no mention of the vice president solving the succession problem. 
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That is because that problem had been solved earlier in the summer (see 
Chapter VI). Luther Martin predicted that the larger states (in fact, 
the single largest state) would have a disproportionate influence in se-
lecting· the vice president and therefore would 11 always have him of their 
choice.••23 Most of the objections to the vice presidency, however, dealt 
with the job of presiding over the Senate. The report from the Committee 
of Eleven stated that the vice president .shall be ~officio President of 
the Senate (on September 12 the delegates approved the deletion of ex 
officio). Mr. Gerry opposed this regulation: 
We might as well put the President himself at the head of the 
Legislature. The close intimacy that must subsist between the 
president and vice-president makes it absolutely improper. He 
was against having any vice president. 24 
Colonel Mason also objected to the office as an infringement on the sepa-
. f d . 25 rat1on o powers octr1ne. Mr. Gerry further argued for a two-third 1 s 
vote rather than a three-fourth 1 s vote to override a presidential veto on 
the grounds thatwith the vice president presiding it would increase the 
danger of a few senators, some motivated by a desire for appointment to 
the executive branch, having the power to sustain a presidential veto. 26 
Another objection was that by giving the vice president a vote (in the 
event of a tie), the vice president 1 s home state would actually have 
three votes and thus an 11 unnecessary and unjust preeminence over the 
others.1•27 William R. Davis argued that just the opposite was the case: 
Had the Vice-President been taken from the representation of 
any of the states, the vote of that state would have been under 
local influence in the second. It is true he must be chosen 
from some state; but, from the nature of his election and elec-
tion and office. he represents no one state in particular, but 
al 1 the states.28 
Another defense of making this vice president presiding .officer of the 
Senate was given by James HcHenry: 11The Committee of Detail by their 
2t 
report had at first given to the Senate the choice of their own Presi-
dent, but to avoid cabal and undue influence, it was thought better to 
a 1 te r ·, t. 1129 A h d f h. h . 11 d d not er e ense w 1c IS usua y quote to ay as a commen-
tary on the weakness of the office was given by Mr. Sherman: 
If the vice-President were not to be President of the Senate, 
he would be without employment, and some member by being made 
President must be deprived of his vote, unless when an equal 
division of votes might happen in the Senate, which would be 
but seldom.30 
The constitutional duties of presiding over the Senate and serving 
as successor were not the primary reasons for creation of the vice presi-
dency. Schlesinger is correct in stating, "The Vice Presidency entered 
the Constitution ... to insure the election of a national President. 1131 
The assumption here is that states would, in casting their first elector-
al vote, vote for their "favorite son" and search for someone of national 
prominence when casting the second electoral vote. The assumption is 
further evidence in the original (before the Twelfth Amendment) constitu-
tiona] provision that the runner-up need only have a plurality of elec-
toral votes to be elected vice president. With each state voting for a 
"favorite son" a simple majority requirement would have been tantamount 
to Senate election of the vice president. When Hamilton, Madison, and 
Jay under the pseudonym of Publius wrote newspaper editorials defending 
the proposed constitution, it was Hamilton who defended, in a very brief 
way, the office of vice presidency. Since it is the only reference in 
the Federalist Papers to that office it deserves being quoted here in its 
entirety: 
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the 
President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in 
respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Repre-
sentatives, in respect of the latter. 
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, 
has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It 
has been alleged that it would have been preferable to have 
authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an offi-
cer answering to that description. But two considerations 
seem to justify the ideas of the convention in this respect. 
One is that to secure at all times the possibility of a defini-
tive resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President 
should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any 
State from his seat as senator, to place him in that of Presi-
dent of the Senate, wou 1 d be to exchange, in regard to the State 
from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The 
other consideration is that as the Vice-President may occasion-
ally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme ex-
ecutive magistracy, al 1 the reasons which recommend the mode of 
election prescribed for the one apply with great if not with 
equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is re-
markable that in this, as in most other instances, the objec-
tion which is made would be against the constitution of this 
State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at 
large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional 
substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those 
which would authorize the Vice-President to exercisetheauthor-
ities and discharge the duties of the President.32 
John Adams as Vice President 
John Adams• vice presidency had characteristics which the framers 
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had hoped for the office, but also traces of what was to make the office 
a sort of national joke. Adams certainly brought prestige to the office. 
He had an impressive career as a politician and diplomat. He had been a 
member of the Massachusetts legislature (1768), a delegate to the First 
and Second Continental Congresses, a leader in the breaking of ties with 
England (he signed the Declaration of Independence), a member of Massa-
chusetts 1 Constitutional Convention, and minister to France, Holland, 
and England. Bringing such a reputation to the vice presidency fit very 
nicely with the arguments that had been made about the ••mode of election•• 
selecting the second most capable man for the office. Adams fulfilled 
this prediction, and went on to fulfill another. When Washington decided 
to retire at the end of two terms, it was Adams who became the natural 
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successor, seemingly proving early on that the election system was se-
lecting presidential timber for the second highest office. According to 
Barzman, Adams tolerated being vice preside~t because he wanted (badly) 
to be president. He saw it as a natural stepping stone to the presiden-
cy. Apparently so did Hamilton, for he used his political influence to 
see to it that the vote for Adams did not indicate a strong political 
base for Adams. 
However, Hamilton called on some of the electors not to vote 
for Adams, contending that it would not be appropriate for 
Adams' vote to approach too closely the total received by the 
great Washington. But Hamilton himself wanted to succeed 
Washington, and he hoped that a small vote for Adam~ would re-
flect poorly on the latter's popularity.33 
Adams also attempted to establish the vice presidency as an impor-
tant office in its own right. This can be seen in his relationship with 
Washington and the early years of his presidingoverthe Senate. Williams 
notes, "Adams enjoyed the personal esteem of the President and was fre-
quently consulted by him in those social and diplomatic affairs thatwere 
. d d h. . 1 • • 1134 cons1 ere IS spec1a 1Zat1on. As President of the Senate he attempt-
ed to set a precedent for actively participating in Senate debate and 
proceedings. According to Dorman, he tended to "lecture the members and 
to join in their debates. 1135 One journal of Senate proceedings credits 
Adams with making two or three speeches a day from the Chair. 36 Williams 
summarizes best Adams' early attitudetoward the Senate: 
John Adams early stamped the chamber as his plaything; from 
the first he refused to be the important chairman. He conceiv-
ed the office as a place to exercise the functions of majority 
leader and thus was for all practical purposes a member of the 
Senate. He presented the agenda, intervened in debate, apos-
trophized the Senate for real or fancied derelictions of duty, 
refused to yield the chair when the Senate turned itself into 
Committee of the Whole, gave his opinions on any matters before 
it when he felt like it, and exercised his right of cas7ing 
votes more than any other future Vice-President would.3 
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Adams, however, did not continue to follow his own precedent. When the 
Senate started to reject this active role from what they considered an 
outsider, Adams began to sit back passively. Vice Presidents have been 
passively presiding over the Senate (when they take the time to be pre-
sent in the chamber) ever since. 
What are generally considered today to be characteristics of the 
vice presidency deserving criticism were also present during Adams 1 ten-
ure. Adams was selected as a running mate to balance, geographically, 
Washington 1 s home state of Virginia. This was the beginning of what 
later developed into 11 balancing the ticket. 11 Washington did not even 
view Adams as his electoral successor to office.38 The Adams vice presi-
dency ended without setting any major precedents. Adams had tried to be 
a significant national political officer. He had, for example, tried to 
participate significantly in Washington 1 s administration (even sitting 
in on cabinet meetings when Washington was absent). He had also tried 
to play an active role in the Senate proceedings. Yet, the vice presi-
dency did not become an important office. Future vice presidents copied 
Adams 1 later example of sitting passively during Senate debate or not at-
tending the Senate at all. After all, the Senators would not accept an 
active 11outsider, 11 andtheir vote was really only half a vote. 39 The 
election of Jefferson, a Democrat, as vice president during Adams 1 Feder-
alist administration could no doubt be accused of furthering this ten-
dency. Jefferson, in reacting to Adams 1 party leanings, was also weaken-
ing the possibility of a strong vice presidency in the future. Young 
writes of a specific instance which exemplifies this point: 
Adams asked his Vice President to undertake a diplomatic mis-
sion to France. Jefferson, a former Minister to that country, 
might have averted the drift toward undeclared war with the 
revolutionary regime in Paris, but he refused Adams 1 request. 
His theoretical reason was that such an assignment lay outside 
his constitutional duties. As a practical matter, he had no 
intention of aiding a political opponent.4° 
Young 1 s next sentence points out a major gap in the development of the 
30 
vice presidency. He states, 11 Nearly 150 years would pass before a Vice 
President would travel abroad in an official capacity, or undertake any 
h . . b. 1 . . 1141 ot er Important respons1 1 1t1es. The accuracy of Young 1 s assessment 
is demonstrated by the fact that anecdotal material has since dominated 
studies of the vice presidency. 
Twelfth Amendment 
Most American history books discuss the presidential election of 
1800 and its outcome 1 s responsibility for proposal and ratification of 
the Twelfth Amendment. Although both Jefferson and Burr received a ma-
jority (this was possible because each elector had two votes and the 
Constitution specified a majority of electors to win), they tied and 
therefore the contingency plan, as specified in the Constitution, was 
. d 42 tr1ggere . It is important to note that it was widely understood that 
Jefferson was running for president and Burr for vice president. Because 
electors, under the original Constitution, could not specify this, Burr 
could be elected president. The tie had actually occurred because of 
the faithfulness of the electors in following the party line. Even as 
early as 1796, the parties were selecting 11 tickets, 11 that is, selecting 
one candidate for president and another for vice president. The Twelfth 
Amendment was not responsible for this practice. The development of 
political parties was. Basically, then, all the Twelfth Amendment did 
was prevent future tie votes between individuals running for the two 
offices by requiring that each elector specify one vote for president 
and one vote for vice president. The vice presidency did continue to 
develop as electoral bait. Whether or not this strategy is based on 
accurate voter behavior is discussed in the next chapter. 
Other Amendments 
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Two other amendments include provisions relating to the vice presi-
dency. The Twentieth Amendment provides for contingencies if a president 
has not been chosen by noon, January 20 (inauguratjon), in the event a 
president elect dies before inauguration, or if3 president elect has fail-
ed to qualify before inauguration. These provisions have had no impact 
since the ratification of the Amendment in 1933. The Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment, dealing with presidential succession, is discussed in Chapter VI. 
It has been suggested that another amendment has indirectly affect-
ed vice presidency. Cronin suggests that the Twenty-Second Amendment, 
which places a two-term limit on presidents, creates a better chance for 
vice presidents to move up to the presidency. Given the two-term tradi-
tion which preceded this amendment, and the lack of any vice president 
before this Amendment (except Van Buren) to be elected president on his 
own, the increase in odds is insignificant. 
A New Vice Presidency? 
The newly nominated presidential candidate's speech (given on the 
day of announcing his choice of running mate) which promises increasing 
the importance of the office of the vice presidency has become a tradi-
tion in American politics. Just as traditional is the failure to make 
the office an important part of the administration. Consider, for exam-
ple, what some believe to be the best president-vice president 
relationship in this century: the Carter-Mondale relationship. Arti-
cles on the vice presidency now focus on Mondale 1 s vice presidency as 
the one with which to compare all others. 43 
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Cronin asks, 11Will the Mondale-Carter relationship establish a pre-
cedent for succeeding administrations? 1144 The question, which Cronin 
never directly addresses, is what kind of precedent is being discussed 
here? Apparently, what Cronin is referring to is the intimacy and 
friendship that existed between Carter and Mondale. In discussing the 
11Mondale Model 11 he states, 11Most students of the vice presidency agree 
that Mondale enjoyed a closer and better relationship with his boss, 
President Jimmy Carter, than any previous vice-president. 1145 About the 
only thing which most commentators can pronounce as a definite trend es-
tablished by Carter was giving his vice president an office in the White 
House (Bush also has an office in the White House). These 11precedents 11 
serve as a commentary on the continued weakness of the office rather 
than demonstrating a new important role. 
When one turns from the current rise in the 11 trappings 11 of the vice 
presidency to the actual duties assigned to them, the same conclusion 
emerges. When reading about the duties performed by vice presidents 
(particularly by those authors wanting to retain the office), one is re-
minded of the college senior 1 s resume. Consider the followingvicepresi-
dents and their most important duties: 
Richard Nixon: Chairman of the Commission on Government Con-
tracts; Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability;46 
Presiding over numerous meetings of the Cabinet and the Nation-
al Security Council in the President 1 S absence; Visiting fifty-
four foreign nations on special diplomatic missions; Liaison 
between the administration and the C~ngress; Chief political 
campaigner for the Republican Party. 7 
Lyndon Johnson: Chairman of the Committee on Equal Employment 
Opportunities; Chairman of the Peace Corps National Advisory 
" 
Council ;48 Chairman of the Committee on Government Contracts; 
Chairman of the Aeronautics and Space Counci 1; Member of spe-
cial executive committee of the National Security ~EXCOMM); 
Making eleven tours outside of the United States.4 
Hubert Humphrey: Chairman of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Council; Coordinator of all federal activities in the 
civil rights field; Head of the National Advisory Council on 
anti-poverty programs; Chairman of Cabinet task force on 
youth; Overseer of program to encourage American and foreign 
tourists to •see the U.S.A. •; Liaison with majors; Lobbyist 
for Johnson•s programs on Capitol Hill.50 
Theodore Agnew: Head of Intergovernmental Relations Council; 
Chairman of several minor, non-policy commissions;5l Fund-
raiser and campaign speaker;52 Vice Chairman of the Urban Af-
fairs Council; Head of the National Council on Marine Re-
sources.53 
Gerald Ford: President 1 s representative on Capitol Hill.54 
Nelson Rockefeller: Chairman of commission to investigate CIA 
activities; Vice Chairman of the Domestic Council; Chairman of 
the Committee on the Right of Privacy; Chairman of the Nation-
al Commission on Productivity and Work Quality; Chairman of 
Federal Compensation Commission; Member of the Board of Re-
gents of the Smithsonian Institution; Chairman of the National 
Commission on Water Quality; Member of the Commission on the 
Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Poli-
cy.55 
Walter Mondale: Chairman of the White House executive commit-
tee;56 Liaison with Congress; In-house political adviser.57 
George Bush: National Security Assistant of Head of the White 
House crisis management teamA Chairman of the Presidential Task 
Force on Regulatory Relief;5° Ex officio member of Cabinet 
council on legal affairs;59 Director of Cabinet level group to 
combat drug smuggling.60 
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Of course, all the above named vice presidents had the constitution-
al job of presiding over the Senate and all are legally a member of "the 
National Security Council. One is impressed with two points when read-
ing the list of vice presidential duties. First, it is apparent that 
much of what is assigned to a vice president is make-work. According to 
National Journal, it was make-work that Mondale wanted to avoid and hence 
h . f 1 k 1" f . 61 IS re usa to ta e many 1ne unctions. Second, one is impressed 
34 
with some of the tasks vice presidents are given. Either these signify 
nothing more than fancy titles for do-nothing commissions or else vice 
presidents are not getting credit for much of what goes on in the presi-
dency. It seems safe to conclude that the former comes closer to the 
truth. Our most current vice president, for example, has experienced 
frustrations such as when two of his aides resigned because they had so 
little to do. 62 
However much vice presidents try, it seems almost impossible for 
them to shed the old Trottlebottom concept. 63 There is little evidence 
to support the idea that the Carter-Mondale relationship will make any 
difference in the traditional role of the vice president. George Reedy 
perhaps said it best: 
The thing about the Vice President is that he has almost no 
power base and if you don 1 t have that under the American pol it-
ical system you have nothing. He has derivative power, what 
the President allows him to have. Mondale may have the ear of 
the President, but that doesn 1 t change the office itself.64 
Still, presidents seem to take the selection of their running mate 
very seriously, and it could be that presidents are elected or defeated 
on the basis of their choice. 
Summary 
The office of vice president of the United States was probably pat-
te~ned after the 1 ieutenant governor•s office found in several colonial 
governments. These lieutenant governors, as we refer to them today, 
sometimes went by the title of vice president. Their primary function 
in the colonies was to serve as immediate successor to the governor. 
Though this was not the reason for the creation of the vice presidency, 
he was given the same function. The 1 ieutenant governor was also a 
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member of the governor's counci 1 and presided over this group in the 
governor's absence. The parallel with the vice president occurs here 
too. The framers made the vice president the President of the Senate. 
Finally, just as controversies between governor and 1 ieutenant governor 
were usually resolved in the governor's favor, vice presidents have found 
very little power which they may use on their own, independent of the 
president. The same reasons were applied to the creation of the lieuten-
ant governor in the various state governments following independence. 
The framers' rationale for the creation of the vice presidency was 
to remedy the problem of electing the president. It was not created to 
solve the succession problem, but once created was seen as an officer 
who could do so. The immediate problem with presidential election was 
to provide an electoral system that would please both large and small 
states. Having adopted and then later disposed of the proposal to allow 
Congress to elect the president, the delegates compromised and opted in-
stead for election by electors. To further moderate the large state-
small state controversy, each elector was given two votes (with there-
quirement that no elector could cast both votes for individuals from 
their home state). The assumption was that the first vote cast by an 
elector would probably be for a "favorite son," while the second vote 
would, because of the out-of-state requirement, be cast for a "national" 
figure. Having given each elector two votes, the second office (vice 
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presidency) was created and subsequently named as successor and Senate 
Pres·i dent. 
Although John Adams, the first vice president, contributed his pres-
tige to the office, and although he tried to establish himself (and in-
directly the vice presidency) as an active participant in Senate 
proceedings, the office did not develop into one of importance. On the 
contrary, the one precedent which Adams' vice presidency did establish, 
balancing the ticket, is now cited as a fundamental problem with the 
office. 
Several constitutional amendments pertain to the vice presidency, 
but most have had little direct effect on the office. The Twelfth Amend-
ment is sometimes blamed with the development of presidential tickets 
(and the practice of using the vice presidency to balance the ticket). 
Ticket balancing is due more to the development of political parties 
rather than this Amendment. The Twentieth Amendment prescribes a contin-
gency if a president-elect dies or fails to qualify before inauguration. 
The Twenty-Second Amendment 1 imits a president to two elected terms and 
could indirectly affect the vice presidency; however, given the strong 
two-term tradition that preceded this Amendment, one would have thought 
that any such effect would have already been demonstrated. The Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1967, outlines the procedures for filling 
vice presidential vacancies and the role and status of vice presidents 
in presidential disability. 
While most presidents promise to make the vice presidency an impor-
tant office, none has delivered on the promise. Although it remains to 
be seen how powerful Bush will be in the Reagan administration, the last 
president to make such a promise (Carter) did not give his vice president 
(Mondale) any important duties. Still, the Carter-Mondale relationship 
is viewed by some as the dawning of a new age for the vice presidency. 
Much of what is actually assigned to vice presidents is make-work. Man-
dale may have been physically and temperamentally closer to Carter than 
other vice presidents have been to their respective presidents, but no 
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significant duties were assigned to him. Even if they had been, it is 
clear that this would not change the office because this was a preroga-
tive of Carter. The vice presidency is still an unimportant office. 
Why not abolish it? 
The following chapter is one of several which examines reasons given 
for not abolishing the vice presidency. Chapter I I I wi 11 empirically 
test the view that the vice presidency should be retained because as an 
elected official (and the only other one, besides the president, with a 
national constituency), he makes the best successor. 
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CHAPTER I I I 
THE ELECTORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE 
Conventional wisdom about American politics holds that the choice 
made by the presidential candidate and his party as to whom should be the 
vice presidential candidate is apt to have a decisive effect on the elec-
tion. There are many instances in recent American politics in which the 
choice of a running mate seemed of dramatic importance. 
During the 1980 Republican Convention, for example, Republican party 
leaders held their breath while waiting for Ronald Reagan to announce his 
choice for his vice presidential running mate. With rumors running ram-
pant, several Rep,ublican leaders at the convention thought the ''perfect'' 
Reagan-Ford ticket was about to be created. Later reports confirmed some 
of the rumors, although no one (outside of Reagan and Ford themselves) 
knows for sure how serious either Reagan or Ford were in their conci lia-
tory gestures toward each other. What we do know is that all of this 
speculation created some excitement in what was otherwise thought to be a 
dull convention. Reports had been circulating for some time before the 
convention that Reagan was purposely concealing his preference for a run-
ning mate to generate public interest in the convention. Since the net-
works usually cover the conventions from gavel to gavel, any foreseeable 
surprises would give the Republicans full advantage of the free advertis-
ing which the coverage provided. 1 
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Balancing the Ticket 
In choosing his running mate, Reagan was involved in an important 
political decision. This was a decision which past nominees, from both 
parties, had thought could be the deciding factor in whether or not they 
were elected. Because of the perceived electoral significance in the 
running mate decision, presidential nominees have usually selected a run-
ning mate that "balances the ticket." This simply means selecting some"" 
one that differs from the presidenial nominee in some respect (ideology, 
geography, religion, etc.) with th~ hope of obtaining more votes. It 
does not mean that presidential nominees have sought running mates who 
were forceful in countering their own policy positions or political phi-
losophies. If that were the case, Schlesinger would be right when he 
says that the idea of a "balanced ticket 11 is a fraud on the public. 2 But 
that is not the case. Schlesinger 1 s interpretation focuses on the word 
"balance" but ignores the word "ticket," which is the key to understand-
ing that phrase. The idea of balancing the ticket was an adaptation to 
the early development of political parties. It was furthered along by 
ratification of the Twelfth Amendment. That amendment was ratified to 
remedy the mutation that had occurred in 1800 with Jefferson and Burr. 
Survival in politics is translated as winning, and that is exactly 
what presidential nominees have in mind when choosing a running mate. A 
clear example is Kennedy 1 s selection of Johnson in 1960. 3 Though some-
what disillusioned with his selection of Johnson, Kennedy 1 s aides took 
the time to add up the electoral votes Johnson could attract. They were 
surprised (no doubt pleasantly) to discover that the electoral vote of 
the states they assumed Johnson could carry could guarantee victory. 4 
Johnson found himself in a similar situation while running for president 
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in 1964. During the early summer he ordered numerous polls costing many 
thousands of dollars to assess the vote-pulling ability of various hope-
5 fuls. Nixon also conducted polls in 1968 to determine which potential 
. ld b "b h. l . 6 runn1ng mate cou est contr1 ute to IS e ect1on. 
Presidential incumbents seeking reelection are not immune to this 
agonizing process. In 1956, Eisenhower vacillated between hinting at 
dumping Nixon from the ticket and vague supportive statements for him. 7 
Likewise, if Nixon had wanted to ''dump" Agnew in the 1972 presidential 
election, the anticipated electoral consequences of doing so would have 
probably prevented him from ta~ing such action. 
The reasons for selecting a particular vice presidential candidate 
are numerous, but can be grouped into two categories: (l) internal rea-
sons, such as satisfying a wing of the party; and (2) external reasons, 
such as appealing to a segment of the electorate outside the party. Both 
categories of reasons, though different in their own particular ways, 
are aimed at the end of selecting a winning ticket. Ultimately, one has 
to believe that party unity is not sought, at least by American politi-
cal parties, as an end in itself, but as a means to winning. Even a 
"purist" candidate like George McGovern, after promising 1000 percent 
support for Eagleton, opted for the more electorally appealing candidate. 
Bringing electoral strength to the ticket is the overriding concern in 
most vice presidential selections. When it is not, such as in the case 
of the Republicans in 1964 and perhaps in 1976, the result has been dis-
appointing to the ticket. 
Much of this seems to contradict the conventional wisdom concerning 
vice presidential selection. That wisdom states that presidential candi-
dates give very little thought to whom they might select for running 
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mates. Most of the accounts of this process describe the presidential 
nominee on the night of his nomination frantically cal ling potential run-
ning mates until the wee hours of the morning when finally someone ac-
cepts. That may have been the case with McGovern in 1972, but it was 
not the case with Johnson in 1964, Nixon in 1968, or Carter in 1976. Fur-
thermore, indications are that it will most likely not be the case in the 
years to come. The reason is presidential primaries. 
The increasing use of the presidential primary has made the dead-
locked convention extinct. Since 1952, neither major party 1s convention 
has gone beyond one ballot. Also, since 1972, about three-fourths of 
the delegates have been selected in presidential primaries. Jimmy Carter 
was literally an unknown when he began running for president. His vic-
tories in the primaries, however, propel led him into front-runner status. 
Because of the bandwagon effect produced by victories in the early pri-
maries, Carter 1 s nomination was not in question when the convention met. 
As a result~ attention shifted to his choice for a running mate. Carter 
began his vice presidential search in mid-April. The search consisted 
of 1 i s t s campi 1 ed by aides, pub 1 i c opinion po 11 s and. calls to 11d i st in-
guished Americans. 118 Just prior to the convention he invited three men 
to Plains to interview for possible selection. 9 Ronald Reagan has had 
two rather unique experiences in vice presidential selection. In 1976, 
he announced his vice presidential selection before the convention even 
met. Four years later he purposely withheld his choice unti 1 the last 
minute, probably to attract attention to the convention. If presiden-
tial primaries continue to be popular and increase in number, the result 
could be that the presidential nominees are decided before the convention 
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meets. The selection of the vice presidential running mate may then be-
come the big event at the nominating conventions. 
Whether it is true or not, presidential candidates seem to believe 
that the election may hinge on whom they choose for a running mate. lm-
plicit in this belief is the assumption that voters may cast their vote 
for president on the basis of the person selected for vice president. 
Unlike the procedure used in most states for electing a lieutenant gover-
nor, the voter in a presidential election is faced with a 11 packaged 
deal.'' In casting a vote for a presidential candidate, the voter is, at 
the same time, casting a vote for the respective vice presidential candi-
10 
date. Is there any evidence to support the assumption that voters cast 
a vote on the basis of the vice presidential candidate? While recogniz-
ing the electoral strategy used in selecting a vice presidential running 
mate, Polsby and Wildavsky state, '~ctually there is no evidence whatso-
ever to suggest that Vice-Presidents add or detract from the popularity 
of Presidential candidates by the vdters.''ll 
Voting for Vice President? 
While he may not have had any evidence on which to base his opinion, 
Richard Nixon thought that the vice presidential candidate did detract 
from the presidential candidate's popularity. In 1968, he stated, 11The 
12 Vice President can't help you. He can only hurt you.'' In his specific 
case, Nixon's polls indicated that when his name was paired with the name 
of any of the numerous men who had been mentioned as possible vice presi-
dential candidates, Nixon's poll figures declined. 13 
The data in Tables I I and I I I indicate that Nixon may have been cor-
rect in his generalization. The data in these tables come from 
TABLE II 
FEELING TOWARD VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND HOW RESPO~JDENT VOTED (IN PERCENT) 
Voted for 
Ticket 
Did not Vote 
for Ticket 
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interviews conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the lnsti-
t f S . 1 R h h U . . f M" h" 14 T bl II . d" tu e or oc1a esearc at t e n1vers1ty o JC 1gan. a e 1n 1-
cates that voters 1 feelings toward a vice presidential candidate is re-
lated to how a voter votes. For the years examined, the average percent 
of those with favorable feelings toward a vice presidential candidate 
that vote for the respective presidential candidate is 68.4 percent. On 
the other hand, of those with unfavorable feelings toward a vice presi-
dential candidate only 17.7 percent supported the ticket. It would seem, 
from these data, that feelings toward vice presidential candidates is 
very important in determining how individuals vote. But it must be re-
membered that voters do not have the prerogative of voting for each can-
didate on the ticket. It is a 11 package deal. 11 This complicates the pro-
cess for determining the electoral significance of vice presidential 
candidates. For example, it might be that only 19.9 percent of those 
with unfavorable feelings toward Dole in 1976 voted for Ford because they 
had unfavorable feelings toward Ford. The mention of Dole to these indi-
viduals might suggest nothing more than a fruit canning company. The 
same principal could also apply to those with favorable feelings toward 
Dole. Although 69.8 percent of those who were favorably disposed toward 
Dole voted for Ford, this may just be due to the fact that the same pea-
ple were favorably disposed toward Ford. In short, the voting pattern 
in Table I I might be as much a res~lt of the feelings the voter has to-
wards the presidential candidate as it is feelings toward the vice presi-
dential candidate. In an attempt to demonstrate this, a control v>~as 
added separating the feelings toward presidential and vice presidential 
candidates (see Table I I 1). The first observation to be made from Table 
I I I is that in every case under study the percentages decline when 
moving from left to right across the table. Not surprisingly, voters 
with favorable feelings for both candidates on a ticket usually voted 
for these candidates. In the six tickets examined, over three-fourths 
of this group, on the average, voted for the ticket. The corollary is 
just as obvious. On the average only about 3 percent of those who had 
unfavorable feelings toward both candidates of a ticket voted for the 
ticket. The two inner columns of Table I I I present information which 
is more revealing and less obvious. 
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A significant difference exists between the voting patterns of vot-
ers who like a presidential candidate but disagree in their feelings to-
ward a vice presidential candidate (Table I I I, columns 1 and 2). As 
previously stated, on the average three-fourths of those voters with 
favorable feelings toward both candidates vote for the ticket. The aver-
age for those voters with favorable feelings toward the presidential can-
didate and unfavorable feelings toward the vice presidential candidate 
is about 46 percent. The average difference between these two groups is 
just over 30 percent. A much smaller difference exists between the vot-
ing pattern of voters who dislike a presidential candidate but disagree 
over their feelings toward a vice presidential candidate (Table I I I, col-
umns 3 and 4). Thus, those voters who did not like a presidential candi-
date voted about the same regardless of their feelings about the respec-
tive running mate. The average difference between the two groups is 14 
percentage points. 
The revealing point about the data presented in Table I I I is the 
indication that a running mate usually hurts a ticket but does not help 
it much. Those who like a presidential candidate are frequently dis-
gruntled enough by the vice presidential choice to vote for someone else. 
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Those who do not 1 ike the presidential candidate rarely support the can-
didate even though they may like the vice presidential choice. 
Though he may have overstated the case, Richard Nixon was basically 
correct when he stated that a vice presidential candidate can only hurt 
a presidential candidate's chances of winning. There are, however, sev-
eral circumstances in which this would not be the case. One would be if 
everyone who liked a presidential nominee also liked the vice presiden-
tial nominee. It was this reasoning which apparently dictated Nixon's 
strategy in 1968. He avoided the "glamour boys" (Reagan, Lindsay, and 
Romney) and selected Agnew instead. By doing so, Nixon must have felt 
that the voters who liked him would have less of a tendency to dislike a 
relatively unknown running mate. The practice of "balancing the ticket" 
makes this practice unlikely. Another circumstance in which a vice pres-
idential candidate could help the ticket would be if a vice presidential 
candidate was popular enough to change negative feelings toward the pres-
idential candidate into positive feelings. A final circumstance might 
explain the surprising figures for Agnew in Table Ill. In 1972, almost 
38 percent of those liking Agnew and disliking Nixon voted for Nixon. 
While several reasons could be given for such a high figure, the best 
reason would seem to be the fact that Agnew was an outspoken incumbent 
vice president who had established his own following. Four years earlier 
Agnew also seemed to add much greater than average support for Nixon, but 
that was due to the low number of individuals that 1 iked Nixon but dis-
1 i ked Agnew. 16 
The Home State Strategy 
Even though the data indicate that the tendency is for a vice 
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presidential candidate to hurt the ticket, there still exists the argu-
ment that a presidential candidate can count on the electoral votes of 
the vice presidential candidate's home state. One could further argue 
that this belief would lead a presidential candidate to select a running 
mate from an electorally large state. Both of these arguments are cor-
rect. 
In this century, the president has carried the vice presidential 
candidate's state 85.7 percent of the time. Two-thirds of the vice pres-
idential candidate's home states were electorally large states. 17 
This does not, however, directly address the question of the "home 
state'' strategy. While it may be true that presidential candidates tend 
to carry the home state of their running mates, this does not necessari-
ly mean this is an important factor in winning the election. Figure 2 
indicates that this is, in fact, not the case. In only one election in 
this century would the loss of a running mate's home state resulted in 
losing the election. If Wilson had not carried Indiana, he would have 
lost the election. Ironically, in that presidential election both vice 
presidential candidates were from the same state. The weakness of the 
"home state" argument is further demonstrated by the fact that in 70 per-
cent of the elections, no one state would have made a difference in the 
election. A presidential candidate could have won by selecting a run-
ning mate from a larger state in only six elections. 
cases, no one state could have made a difference. 
Summary 
In the remaining 
Contrary to popular belief, presidential nominees do not always ig-
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hours of the convention. Furthermore, increasing use of presidential 
primaries should place more attention on the vice presidential selection. 
Presidential candidates often select running mates to help them get 
elected. Sometimes this means selecting someone who appeals to a parti-
cular group, ideology, or region to 11 balance the ticket. 11 At other times 
it means selecting someone to unite the party. In either case the goal 
is to win. This study has shown that the tendency is for the vice presi-
dential candidate to hurt rather than help the ticket. The only time a 
vice presidential candidate could help a ticket is if the candidate is 
extremely popular or has a loyal following of his own. It is unlikely 
that a presidential candidate will find an extremely popular candidate 
who wishes to be vice president. The next best alternative would be for 
a presidential candidate to select a non-controversial, relatively un-
known person for a running mate. This will minimize the negative feel-
ings the voters might have for such a candidate. The success of this 
strategy will be affected by other factors such as the number and popu-
larity of potential vice presidential nominees which a presidential can-
didate rejects. It also depends on the behavior of the vice presiden-
tial candidate. One author in discussing Agnew during the 1968 election 
d h h b h . f . l . k d . h . l8 note t at e ecame somet 1ng o a nat1ona JO e ur1ng t e campaign. 
When balancing the ticket, candidates should be aware of the fact 
that one state has infrequently been a deciding factor in the election. 
For example, if forced to choose between an individual who balances ideo-
logy but comes from an electorally small state and another individual 
who does not provide much of an ideological balance but comes from an 
electorally large state, the presidential candidate would in all prob-
ability be off selecting the ideological balance. This is particularly 
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true if the same individual is not disliked by any major segments of the 
population. 
Besides the im~lications this study has for selecting vice presiden-
tial running mates, there are also some implications for the institution 
of the vice_presidency itself. Several reforms in the vice presidency 
have been proposed which range from increasing the strength of the vice 
presidency to abolishment of the office. The vice presidency is often 
defended as providing an 11elective'' successor in the event of a vacancy 
d . b. 1. 19 or 1 sa 1 1 ty. Yet, the data presented here indicate that few people 
vote for a vice presidential candidate (or for a president because of 
the vice presidential candidate). On th~ contrary, people tend to vote 
against vice presidents. Given the present election procedures, it 
would seem this defense no longer exists. While it is true that since 
WW I I five previous vice presidents have been nominees for the presiden-
cy, only one (Richard Nixon) won without first being ensconced with the 
office of the presidency. 
One alternative to abolishment would be to change the election pro-
cess for vice presidents. Several methods have been proposed ranging 
from making the vice presidency an appointive office to permitting the 
voter to ~ast a se~arate vot~ for vice president (as is done in many 
states in electing lieutenant governors). These and other proposals are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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people. Here 1 S how it works. If you don 1 t feel particularly warm or 
cold toward a person, then you should place him in the middle of the ther-
mometer, at the fifty degree mark. If you have a warm feeling toward a 
person, or feel favorably toward him, you would give him a score some-
where between fifty and one hundred degrees, depending on how warm your 
feeling is toward that person. On the other hand, if you don 1 t feel very 
favorable toward a person--that is, if you don 1 t care too much for him--
then you would place him somewhere between zero and fifty degrees. Of 
course, if you don 1 t know too much about a person, just tell me and we 1 11 
go on to the next name. 11 For this analysis the scores were receded so 
that a score from one to forty-nine was coded as an unfavorable feeling 
while a score from fifty-one to ninety-seven was coded as a favorable 
feeling (neutral feelings are omitted from the analysis). All of the sur-
veys were conducted before the election except the 1968 survey. 
15oorman, p. 292. 
16 1n the 1968 national sample only 14 people who voted liked Agnew 
and disliked Nixon. Four of these reported that they voted for Nixon 
while the other 10 voted for a candidate other than Nixon. It would seem 
that if an individual did not like Nixon, they also disliked Agnew. 
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17A state was considered electorally large if it would fall into the 
category of states that rank highest in electoral votes and give, if won, 
an electoral majority to a candidate. 
18 
Dorman , p . 30 1 . 
19see H. H. Humphrey, 11 Changes in the Vice Presidency, 11 Current His-
tory, 67 (August, 1974), pp. 58-59, 89-90; Marie D. Natali, 11Abol ishthe 
Vice Presidency? 11 Presidential Studies Quarterly, 9, No. 2 (1979), pp. 
202-206; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, Applica-
tion of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to Vacancies in the Office of the Vice 
PreSiden~93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, pp. 193-194-;205-208. ------
CHAPTER IV 
NEW METHODS OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 
Numerous proposals have been put forth for 11 improving 11 the method 
f l . . • d 1 o se ect1ng v1ce pres1 ents. The first major reform to be adopted was 
ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804. Prior to this amendment, 
no one ran for vice president, since the .runner-up in the presidential 
election became vice president. This fact explains why the original 
Constitution (before amendments) did not specify the qualifications for 
being vice president, another detail addressed in the Twelfth Amendment. 
Under this original election system several so-called problems arose. 
First, it allowed the election of a president of one party and a vice 
president from a different party. Thus, in 1796 John Adams, a Feder-
alist, was elected president and Thomas Jefferson, a Democratic-Republi-
can, was elected vice president. Custom, however, began to correct this 
so-called flaw but in the process created a new 11 flaw. 11 As political 
parties solidified and the electors became automatic in their support 
for their party 1 s nominee, it was not as likely that the kind of party 
split as occurred with Adams-Jefferson would arise. Various methods for 
selecting electors (such as by congressional district) could increase or 
decrease the chances of a party split, but given the early custom of the 
general ticket system in most states, it was likely that this problem 
would not have persisted. On the other hand, the increasing influence 
of party on the elector 1 s choice did point up a new problem of the in-
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creasing possibility of all the electors casting their votes for two 
candidates with the result of a tie. This occurred in the presidential 
election of 1800. Because every Democratic-Republican elector cast one 
vote for Jefferson and one vote for Burr, each received a majority of 
the total number of electors; therefore, the election was thrown into 
the House. Although it was understood that Burr was not intended to be 
president, he saw the chance to possibly win and this resulted in empha-
sizing the kind of intrigue and confusion that could emerge in future 
election. The Twelfth Amendment, by separating the electors' votes for 
president and vice president, did remedy this "problem." 
Sindler argues that any proposal to change the method of selecting 
vice presidents should be evaluated by their violation (or not) of the 
following three constraints: 
1. The presidential successor should be of the same party as 
the last president. 
2. The presidential successor should have, broadly, the same 
policy outlook as the last president. 
3. The presidential nominee should have considerable discre-
tion and the controlling say in the designation of a run-
ning mate and the controlling say in ~he determination of 
the activities of the vice-president. 
These constraints are generally recognized by those examining change 
in the vice presidency. They were also the major constraints which the 
subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments recognized when writing the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. These three constraints are justified for vari-
ous reasons, but the argument for accepting them can be summarized as 
insuring continuity. To have a vice president of a different party than 
the president would violate this continuity if the vice president were 
to succeed. In addition, what president is going to assign his vice 
president important duties and prepare him for the possibility of sue-
ceeding if the vice president is a member of another party? The same 
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arguments apply to the second and third constraints listed above. Given 
the consensus which exists on the importance of being guided by these 
constraints when considering reforming the vice presidency, each propos-
al should be examined with these constraints in mind. This is done in 
the following discussion on reforming the selection of the vice presi-
dent. 
Each of the following reforms will be evaluated in view of these 
constraints. 
Vice Presidential Primaries 
Since 1972, presidential candidates have literally been for~ed to 
drop the old strategy of entering presidential primaries to 11show11 sup-
port rather than to 11 bui ld 11 support. Because three-fourths of the con-
ventions1 delegates are now selected in primaries, candidates must enter 
several primaries in order to be considered a serious contender. This 
is drastically different from the not so distant past when Hubert Hum-
phrey could be nominated in 1968 having never entered a primary. Not 
only must candidates enter for the practical reason of winning delegates, 
there is a growing expectation in the minds of voters that candidates 
should enter in order to place themselves before the public for pre-
convention scrutiny. Vice presidential candidates, on the other hand, 
are notably absent from this process. In fact, what has developed is a 
kind of pre-Twelfth Amendment electoral process at work only at the 
nomination level. That is to say all candidates begin (usually in New 
Hampshire) by running as presidential candidates and the runner-up be-
comes the vice presidential candidate. Consider, for example, the Re-
publican Party candidates in 1980. Initially Bush was Reagan 1s most 
serious contender in the early caucus and primary states. When Reagan 
eventually became the clear party favorite, Bush dropped out and, of 
course, was later selected as Reagan's running mate. It is difficult 
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to come up with any other examples of this pattern, and sb one would 
conclude that this was the exception to the rule. One proposal would 
move in the direction of making this the general rule. That is, why not 
require (or at least expect) vice presidential candidates to enter vice 
presidential primaries in order to win delegates in hopes of winning 
enough to be nominated? This proposal would definitely violate the con-
straint of presidential control over the selection of the running mate. 
It should also violate policy harmony constraint. A slight variation of 
this proposal would be to make the runner-up (in delegate strength) in 
the presidential primaries the presidential nominee's running mate. 
This violates the same constraints as the vice presidential primary pro-
posal. Another variation, violating the same constraints, would be to 
hold a national primary after the convention had selected a presidential 
nominee. Still another possible variation would be to require that a 
presidential and vice presidential candidate enter the primaries (as 
they currently exist) as a team (just as they now campaign in the gen-
eral election). This would, on its face, satisfy all three constraints. 
But, in all probability, presidential candidates would select someone 
of a different political outlook in hopes of satisfying a faction of the 
party. While this is also a criticism of the current system, it would 
be magnified by the timing since candidates would, at the pre-convention 
stage, be wooing party leaders rather than the electorate. It could 
also be argued that this proposal fails on its own merits because it 
would probably exacerbate the problem of selecting higher caliber candi-
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dates for vice president. Few high caliber candidates (and possible 
presidential nominees) would want to commit themselves, early in the 
election, to the second place on the ballot. It would appear that all 
of these proposals violate, though in different degress, the constraints 
deemed essential in selecting a successor to the president. 
Convention Reforms 
Another group of proposals for reforming the selection process 
would retain the convention as the place for nominating the running mate, 
but would make changes in the procedures. 
For example, it has been proposed that the delegates select the 
vice presidential nominee before the presidential nominee. 11The reform 
is intended to heighten the quality of vice-presidential nominees by 
focusing attention on the nomination in its own right and by taking the 
nomination out from under control by the presidential nominee. 113 Not 
only does this proposal violate possibly all three constraints, it could 
result in lowering the caliber of vice presidential candidates by lower-
ing the pool of eligibles to those who did not wish to seek the presi-
dential nomination. 
It has also been proposed that all presidential candidates select 
their running mates about a month before the convention convenes. This 
procedure was actually used by Ronald Reagan in 1976. When it appeared 
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that he might lose the nomination unless he could make inroads into the 
uncommitted delegations, he selected a liberal Republican, Senator 
Schweiker, in July (weeks before the convention met). When this strategy 
appeared to backfire, he sought to demonstrate that Ford would also seek 
to 11 balance the ticket 11 with his choice by urging the convention to adopt 
rule 16(c). This rule would have required all candidates to reveal their 
choice for running mate before the balloting for presidential nominee. 
Reagan forces argued that this was the more democratic way of going about 
the process. The rule was not adopted. 
A related proposal would retain the traditional order of selection 
but would give the delegates the job of selecting a vice presidential 
running mate with no formal preference stated by the presidential nomi-
nee. This 11open convention 11 method has been used. Adlai Stevenson used 
it in 1956, when he refused to hand-pick a running mate, but instead 
allowed the delegates the freedom to choose. The two major contenders 
were John Kennedy and Estes Kefauver, who won the vice presidential nomi-
nation. In 1900, McKinley, whose vice president had died in office, was 
a shoe-in for renomination. He notified the convention that 11he had no 
favorite candidate for the vice presidency and would accept anyone chosen 
4 by the delegates. 11 These occurrences of an 11open convention 11 are the 
only two that have taken place. While seemingly more democratic, this 
method violates the constraint (willingly by the presidential nominee in 
the two historical examples above) of permitting the nominee to have 
final say in choosing his running mate. 
To correct for this flaw another group of proposals retains the 
privilege of the presidential nominee to initiate the selection of the 
running mate but with some variation of the traditional process. One 
such proposal would restrict the presidential nominee 1 s choice to the 
candidates who were nominated at the convention for president. This 
restriction would probably lead to a violation of the constraint that 
the vice president not differ broadly in ideology from the presidential 
candidate. A variation of this reform would be to let the presidential 
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nominee select at least three individuals (unrestricted) from which the 
delegates could choose. This proposal would not seemingly violate any 
of the constraints mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, Sindler rejects it 
for the following reasons: 
The procedure.~.may often move the standard-bearer, not to-
ward a wider involvement of others in the making of the de-
cision, but toward exercising his own control more covertly 
and w~thout being held as clearly responsible for the out-
come. 
Committee Choice 
One set of proposals would utilize either a special ad hoc committee 
or the party's national committee for making the initial selection of a 
running mate subject to the approval or disapproval of the delegates. 
The committee could propose one name or a list of at least three from 
which the delegates could choose their favorite, or the process could be 
reversed so that the presidential nominee would submit his choice (or 
list of possible choices) to the National Committee for approval. Fin-
ally, these two general proposals could be combined so that an ad hoc 
party committee would make the initial selection with the national party 
committee given the role of approving or disapproving the selection. 
One of the above mentioned reforms was utili~ed by the Democratic Party 
in 1972, though not by design. When Senator Eagleton withdrew from the 
ticket, the delegates had dispersed and the Democratic National Commit-
tee was convened to give "formal" approval to McGovern's new choice, 
Sargent Shriver. The problem most often discussed with these proposals 
are the pro forma nature of the presidential nominee's choice or, at 
least in the case of the use of a committee to initially select, deny-
ing the presidential nominee the ultimate choice. Finally, the presi-
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dential nominee could be given, without even a pro forma vote of the 
delegates, an absolute say over who his running mate would be. No con-
straints are violated by this proposal but again Sindler rejects it by 
saying, 
It is questionable whether the public would support a pro-
posal which would strip the original nomination of any ap-
pearance of having been a broadly-based party decision and 
openly acknowledge it as the decision of a single person, 
the presidential nominee.6 
Time Changes 
An entire group of proposed reforms address a problem which has, 
particularly since the Eagleton affair, received much attention, namely 
the constraint of time. Typically, the delegates vote on the presiden-
tial nominee the evening (sometimes very late) of the third day of the 
national convention. The next day the presidential nominee announces 
his vice presidential choice and that evening the delegates vote on his 
choice. Critics have pointed out that this does not give the presiden-
tial nominee sufficient time for screening the potential running mates. 
They point to historical examples (the most current being Eagleton and 
Agnew) to make their point. To remedy this, they propose several ways 
of giving the presidential nominee more time. Most of their proposals 
could be combined with the other proposals discussed here. One would 
be to add a fifth day to the convention and postpone the selection of 
the vice president to that day. 
Almost immediately after Eagleton was dropped in August 1972, 
the Democratic National Committee set up its Commission on 
Vice Presidential Selection, headed by former Vice President 
Humphrey, to study and recommend better ways of selecting the 
party 1 s vice presidential candidates.? 
Speakers at the Democratic commission 1 s hearings generally 
agreed there should be more time between the presidential 
and vice presidential nominations to all for more thorough 
investigation into the backgrounds of potential vice pres-
idential candidates.8 
Commenting on the one-day extension, Sindler states, 
Significantly more time for the nomination decision can be 
had only by moving the matter into the postconvention per-
iod and by depriving the convention of any direct involve-
ment in its settlement.9 
Constitutional Reforms 
There remains a group of reforms which are so drastic they would 
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require that the Constitution be amended. One arose following the util-
ization of section two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment for the appointment 
of Ford and Rockefeller (see Chapter VI). That section permits the pres-
ident to nominate, and the Congress to confirm, a vice president. Be-
cause this procedure was deemed a success when used with Ford and Rocke-
feller, it has been suggested that it be extended to cover all instances 
of vice presidential selection. In short, make the vice president an 
appointive office. As explained by Sindler, this proposal stems from 
the two 11catastrophies 11 experienced with Eagleton and Agnew: 
Perhaps, then, it would be better to have the vice-presidency 
occupied by someone nominated by the president and closely 
reviewed for confirmation by the Congress, on the model of 
what was then occurring on Nixon 1 s nomination of Gerald Ford 
to the vice-presidency? (Emphasis mine.)10 
The two major criticisms to this proposal are as follows: 
One is that a president 1 s control over successorship as dir-
ect as his appointment of his successor is repugnant to a 
democracy, and should not be allowed. The other is that 
presidential successorship posts should be elective not ap-
pointive. 11 
Given the findings of the data presented earlier in this chapter, it is 
difficult to see how the above stated criticism could not just as eas-
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ily be applied to the method of selection currently being used by both 
parties. Although this proposal is usually discussed under the assump-
tion of retaining a fixed term for the vice president, it would also be 
possible, perhaps desirable, to make the vice presidency equivalent to 
that of other superior offices mentioned in the Constitution. This would 
permit the president to remove a vice president. Combined, these two 
proposals (appointment and removal) could result in a higher caliber of 
nominee and one given significant duties to perform. It has long been 
understood that one reason presidents have been so reluctant to give 
vice presidents important duties is because of the constitutional con-
straint on removing them should they differ with the president. Sindler 
notes this when discussing the appointed vice president with a fixed 
term: 
At best, then, changing to an appointive vice president might 
upgrade the average quality of the incumbent (and hence of the 
direct presidential successor), but it would not bring about 
any redefinition of the constricted and dependent role of the 
vice-presidency in our political system. 12 
Another proposed amendment would repeal the Twelfth Amendment, thus 
reverting to the original method of electing vice presidents but with 
one major modification. The proposed amendment would give each elector 
one vote rather than the two specified in the original document. Chap-
ter I I explained the framers 1 rationale for giving each elector two 
votes. It could be argued that tne rationale no longer applies to today 
since the mass media, among other things, discourages the kind of par-
ochialism that the two vote per elector idea was designed to remedy. 
What would be retained from the original plan would be the election of 
the president by a majority of electors and the runner-up being declared 
vice president. This would permit, and perhaps even guarantee, the elec-
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tion of a president from one party and a vice president from another par-
ty. In defense of the proposal, it is argued that it would increase the 
probability of individuals of presidential caliber as vice president. 
Hinckley does not think these individuals would make good vice presidents 
because the vice president would be a rival. 13 On the other hand, con-
cerning the present system she states that it elects a running mate, and 
. k d "d 14 runn1ng mates may not rna e goo pres1 ents. 
Another reform would use a method for electing the president and 
vice president that is currently used in several states to elect the 
governor and lieutenant governor. Of the 43 states that currently have 
a lieutenant governor, 22 (51%) are elected independent of the gover-
15 nor. Unlike presidential elections in which the presidential and vice 
presidential candidates are presented to the voter as a ''package deal," 
in these 22 states the voters cast separate votes for governor and lieu-
tenant governor, and it is not unusual for the two officers to be of 
different political parties. 16 This method could be adopted in presi-
dential elections. It would require a constitutional amendment and 
would also permit the election of a president and vice president of diff-
erent parties. If this proposal were adopted, it would no doubt encour-
age some of the other reforms mentioned earlier. It is likely that this 
would give an impetus to the development of vice presidential primaries. 
It could also encourage repeal of section two of the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment, so that instead of filling vice presidential vacancies through 
appointment, vacancies could be filled by electing a new vice president 
in a special election. While this would democratize the office, it 
would most likely exacerbate the "rival" problem, -and thus presidents 
would only rarely delegate important duties to the vice president. This 
• 
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reform, then, would do no more than insure the continuation of a vice 
president with little authority but, at least, one chosen by the voters. 
It should be noted that the trend at the state level is for more and 
more states to have joint election of the governor and lieutenant gover-
nor. 
A variation of this proposal which has only rarely been discussed 
is to separate the vice presidency from the presidency entirely by elect-
ing the vice president during the mid-term elections rather than with 
the president. 17 This could serve as a kind of referendum on the presi-
dent1s first two years in office. It could also produce a vice president 
of a different political party. Given the tradition of the 11out 11 party 
gaining, on the average, 35 seats in the House in these elections, it 
could mean that the vice president would almost always be of a different 
party. On the other hand, this kind of election might stimulate interest 
in the mid-term elections and thus result in a new tradition of its own. 
Given the radical nature of this proposal it is highly unlikely that it 
would be approved. 
Summary 
The discussion above of the various reforms for selecting a vice 
president demonstrates the complexity in trying to meet the objectives 
of reform and at the same time work within the three constraints consid-
ered important. Of the reforms listed, these would not violate any of 
the constraints. 
1. Require the presidential and vice presidential candidates to 
run in the primaries together. 
2. Require presidential candidates to announce their choice for 
vice president several weeks before the convention convenes. 
3. Require the presidential candidate or nominee to supply the 
delegates of a special committee with a list of three or more possible 
running mates. 
4. Extend the time between the selection of the presidential and 
vice presidential nominees. 
5. Give the presidential nominee absolute say, after the conven-
tion, in selecting a running mate. 
6. Make the vice presidency an appointive office. 
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Reforms one through five could be accomplished without amending the 
Constitution, but number six would require an amendment to the Constitu-
tion. Given the criticism which section two of the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment received for permitting an appointed vice presidency when a vacancy 
occurs in the office and the difficulty of amending the Constitution, it 
is unlikely that this reform will be adopted. Of the other five reforms 
listed above, three would remove or extremely restrict the role of the 
convention delegates. Only numbers. two and four above would not do this, 
although it is possible for number three to also rely on the delegates 
rather than a special committee. 
Requiring presidential candidates to announce their choice for a 
running mate prior to the convention (as Reagan did in 1976) would sup-
ply the media and others with additional time for screening the candi-
date more closely. vJhether it would result in a different kind of vice 
presidential candidate than is sought under the present system is un-
likely. Reagan's choice of Scheweiker is only one example, but it would 
indicate a continuation of the tradition of selecting someone to "balance 
the ticket." Similarly, an extension of time between the selection of 
the presidential and vice presidential candidates would permit greater 
scrutiny of the possible running mate, but would, in all probability, 
have no other significant effect. Given the fact that presidential 
candidates can screen potential runntng mates on their own before the 
convention, and that presidential primaries may encourage this (as in 
the case of Carter in 1976), this reform would not be significant in 
any respect. What, then, can be done? 
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A final proposal would be to abolish the vice presidency. This 
would, of course, require a constitutional amendment, and some provision 
would have to be made in the law for an immediate successor. For ex-
ample, the Secretary of State or some other officer could be made the 
immediate successor upon the aeath, resignatio"n, or removal of a presi-
dent. This proposal would also affect the inability provisions of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. That amendment designates the vice president 
as the individual to declare (along with a majority of the cabinet) the 
president unable to govern. The new law specifying the immediate suc-
cessor could just as easily name the person to act with the cabinet 
(assuming continuation of that part of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment which 
refers to the vice president). Abolition of an office as well establish-
ed as the vice presidency is not likely. Still, few persuasive arguments 
exist for retaining it. Another argument for keeping the office, how-
ever, has not been discussed. This is the argument that a vice presi-
dent makes the 11best 11 successor because it is a good training ground for 
the presidency. Past arguments have been intuitive, and have generally 
been supportive of this contention. 
discussed in the next chapter. 
It is this argument that will be 
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CHAPTER V 
THE VICE PRESIDENCY AS APPRENTICESHIP 
Constitutionally the vice president has one actual job and one po-
tential job. The vice president~ the president of the Senate (Article 
1, Section 3, Clause 4). The vice president may become president or 
11acting president 11 following the death, inability, resignation, or re-
moval of a president (Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5). 
The job of president of the Senate is not taken seriously by most 
vice presidents. The framers• rationale for making the vice president 
president of the Senate, as expressed in Federalist Paper 68, was to 
provide for a ''tie breaker 11 without short changing a state whose senator 
might otherwise be President of the Senate. Although the concern for 
tie votes may have been justified in the early part of the 19th century, 
today they are much more scarce. One study noted that they only occur 
1 now about once every two-and-a-half years. Richard Nixon, when vice 
president, claimed to have spent about 10 percent of his time presiding 
over the Senate. This exemplifies the manner in which almost all vice 
presidents (except John Adams during his first term as vice president) 
have approached this job. It is literally indisputable that the vice 
president would not be missed if removed from this job. 
As the potential successor to the office of the presidency, the 
vice presidency takes on some importance. Presidents, of course, hope 
that vice presidents never have to perform this job. Vice presidents 
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ostensibly never want to perform this job either, but know in the back 
of their minds that doing so might be their 11 big chance. 11 Twentieth 
century vice presidents have been given this chance several times par-
ticularly since World War II (see Table IV). In addition to this, vice 
presidents have increasingly been selected as presidential nominees fol-
lowing their tenure as vice president. Thus, in 1968, both Democrats 
and Republicans turned to past vice presidents for their presidential 
nominees (Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon). Before resigning, Theodore 
Agnew was seen by many as a strong contender for the presidency, and 
Walter Mondale is currently seen as the frontrunner in the Democratic 
race for the party's nomination. 
The fact that the vice presidency has been propelling so many in-
dividuals into the White House or the presidential election, points up 
another 11 indirect 11 function of the vice presidency: training an indi-
vidual to be president. Stating it another way, the vice presidency is 
a kind of internship or apprenticeship. What better way, it is argued, 
for training someone to take over the reins of government? 
This argument has been a major defense for preserving the office 
when proposals for abolishing the office are made. After all, it is 
rather hard to defend the office on the grounds that the government 
would be deprived of a president of the Senate, especially when one of 
the so-called strongest vice presi~ents was absent from the job 90 per-
cent of the time. While another strong argument for retaining the of-
fice relies on the 11 succession 11 function, this argument is predicated 
on the argument that the vice president is best prepared to succeed. If 
the office does not prepare the individual to succeed, then one has no 









SUCCEEDING VICE PRESIDENTS IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY AND SUBSEQUENT PRESIDENTIAL 
NOMINATION OR ELECTION 
Subsequently Subsequently 
Reason for Presidential Elected 
Succession Nominee? Vice President? 
Death of 
President Yes Yes 
Death of 
President Yes Yes 
Death of 
President Yes Yes 
Death of 
President Yes Yes 
Resignation 
of Presi-
dent Yes No 
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just as easily argue that the Secretary of State, or some other officer, 
could serve as successor. At this point one could argue that the vice 
president has one other characteristic which no other national figure 
(except the president) has and that is his gaining office through elec-
tion by a vote of the nation. That argument, which is constitutionally 
sound, may be unfounded in practice as was demonstrated in Chapter 
Ill. 2 
Arguing against the notion of the vice presidency contributing to 
our government by way of a presidential training ground can be very 
difficult. The difficulty lies in the passive nature of this function. 
If a vice president literally does nothing, he could still be learning, 
if nothing else through osmosis, how to be president. The question re-
mains, does the vice presidency perform this function? The importance 
of this question lies in the fact that the answer may be the one deter-
mining if the office should be retained or be abolished. 
Schlesinger, Jr. does not believe the vice presidency prepares its 
incumbents to be president. Rather, just the opposite occurs. He re-
fers to it as a 11maiming experience 11 which, to make matters worse, in-
creases the incumbent 1 s chances of being presidential nominee. 3 
In recent years, as men of larger aspirations and capacities 
have responded to the actuarial attractions of the office, 
the damage to Vice Presidents has increased. The more gifted 
and ambitious the Vice President, the more acute his frustra-
tion--and the less the President is inclined to do to allevi-
ate it ... Few Vice Presidents can survive the systematic de-
moralization inflicted by the office without serious injury 
to themselves.4 
Much has been written, mostly by psychologists, on career 11 burnout 11 in 
high stress jobs such as Jaw enforcement and airline traffic control!-
ers. Yet, Schlesinger is not referring to the kind of 11 burnout 11 that 
results from employment in highly stressful jobs. In the case of the 
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vice president, he seems to be arguing that just the opposite is the 
case. What he describes seems to be closely related to what has been 
called underemployment. Willis Harmon defines underemployment as 11work-
ing at less than one 1 s full productive capacity. 115 An example which he 
gives is the college graduate working in a blue-collar job. In describ-
ing the underemployment he states, 11 As a consequence of wasting their 
human potential, these people often develop such pathologies as chronic 
life disorganization, ... mental depression, ... or other self-destructive ... 
behavior. 116 While this overstates the case for the vice presidency, it 
seems to come close to the destructive experience which Schlesinger ar-
gues vice presidents experience. Is Schlesinger correct? 
Training for the Presidency 
To test this idea all presidents following Jefferson were divided 
into three groups: those who had never served as vice president, those 
who had served as vice president for less than two years, and those who 
had served as vice president for more than two yearsJ The 11 ratings 11 of 
these three groups, taken from four different polls, were then compared. 
The data appear in Table V. 
The fact that presidents who served as vice president for more than 
two years had the worst ratings in all four polls would tend to support 
Schlesinger 1 s argument. In two of the polls, however, presidents who 
had a short tenure as vice president averaged better ratings than the 
other two groups. Still the differences in ratings between those presi-
dents who had never served as vice president and those who had served 
as vice president less than two years were much closer than those with 
more than two years of experience as vice president. For comparison, 
Schlesinger Poll 
(1962)2 




( 19 77) 
Chicago Tribune 
Poll ( 1982) 5 
TABLE V 
AVERAGE RATINGS OF PRESIDENTS BY 
VICE PRESIDENTIAL EXPERIENCE 
Experience of President! 
Never Vice President Vice President 
Vice President <2 Years >2 Years 
2. l 2.0 l.O 
17.6 16.6 21.6 
19.8 20.8 7.0 
64 3. 7 613. l 587.2 
l Pre-Twelfth Amendment presidents are not included. 
2Presidents rated as Great, Near Great, Average, Below Aver-
age, and Failure were scored 4, 3, 2, l, and 0, respectively. 
3 1n this poll the lower the score the better the rating. 




political experiences other than the vice presidency were also analyzed. 
The data appear in Table VI. 
In every poll, presidents who had previously served as governor 
averaged higher ratings than those who had not served as governor. Just 
the opposite was true for service in Congress. In every poll, those 
presidents who had never served in Congress averaged better ratings than 
those who had served in Congress. The highest ratings were for those 
presidents who had served as governor but had not been elected to any 
national office before becoming president. 
Some surprising consistencies emerge when examining the data in 
both Tables Vand VI. When one compares the ratings of the presidents 
for the three different political experiences (governor, congressman, or 
vice president), in every poll the best ratings are for those presidents 
who had been governor and the worst ratings are for those who had been 
vice president for more than two years. Again, the highest ratings (and 
the scores are significantly higher) were for those presidents whose 
only political experience (of the three listed) was serving as governor. 
Years ago many of .our presidents were recruited from governorships. Dur-
ing this century, however, presidential candidates have increasingly been 
recruited from the U.S. Senate. Governorships provided candidates with 
executive experience but also tended to expose them to a narrow range of 
issues. The U.S. Senate exposed candidates to a broad range of issues, 
but prepared them for political maneuvering in a decentralized environ-
ment. The data indicate that the executive experience gained from serv-
ing as governor is better preparation for the presidency than legisla-
tive experience in the U.S. Congress. The data would also indicate that 
the vice presidency is not a good training ground for the presidency and 
TABLE VI 
AVERAGE RATINGS OF PRESIDENTS BY EXPERIENCE] 
AS GOVERNOR OR CONGRESSMAN 
Governor? Congressman? 
Yes No 
Schlesinger (1962) 2 2.4 1.7 3.7 1.9 2.2 
Ma ranne 1- Dodder ( 1970) 3 16.0 19.2 7.0 18.2 17.3 
U.S. Histor4cal Society 
Poll (1977) 23.8 15.3 58.7 15.3 25.5 
Chicago Tribune Po 11 
( 1982) 5 671.7 604. l 795.8 602.6 686.0 
1 . 
Pre-Twelfth Amendment presidents are not included 
2Presidents rated as Great, Near Great, Average, Below 
Average, and Failure were scored 4, 3, 2, 1, and 0, respective-
ly. 
31n this pol 1 the lower the score the better the rating. 
41n this pol 1 the higher the score the better the rating. 




thus indirectly support Schlesinger 1 s contention concerning the negative 
impact which serving as a vice president can have on an individual. 
Vice Presidential Character 
The conclusions discussed above, though tentative, are quite dis-
couraging concerning the increasing occurrence of vice presidents be-
coming presidential nominees and/or president. One could argue, however, 
that the trend has been corrected in recent years by selecting higher 
caliber vice presidents. Furthermore, presidents are more inclined now 
to increase the caliber of the office itself and this has resulted, it 
is argued, in the office undergoing considerable change since the Truman 
administration. Referring to this recent transformation, National Jour-
nal reports the following: 
Thus, while the constitutional prerogatives of Vice Presidents 
have remained static, their political parameters have been ex-
panded, both to ease the burden of the Chief Executive and to 
prepare them for any eventuality, such as the8death, impeach-
ment or physical disability of the President. 
If in fact the office has been upgraded since the Truman administration, 
it should be more attractive to higher caliber politicians than in the 
past. Making the office additionally attractive is the increasing pro-
bability of vice presidents succeeding to the presidency or obtaining 
the presidential nomination. On the other hand, given the history of 
the vice presidency and its reputation as a national joke, one might ar-
gue that anyone enjoying or taking the job seriously would not be the 
kind of individual suited for the presidency. This raises two related 
questions. Are we selecting 11 better 11 vice presidents now than in the 
past? Second, even if the answer is yes, does it matter? Do 11good 11 
vice presidents make 11good 11 presidents? 
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In an attempt to address these questions, an overall rating of vice 
"d "1" d9 pres1 ents was ut1 1ze . This rating was based primarily on the bio-
graphical sketches of vice presidents in S. Barzman•s Madmen and Genius-
10 ) es. Each vice president under study (Wheeler through Mondale was 
d 1 f 1 9 13 d . ff . b 1 11 rate on a sea e o to on 1 erent var 1 a es. The scores for 
each vice president were used to create an overall effectiveness score. 
The highest individual score was Thomas Marshall •s (1.33) while Charles 
Curtis received the lowest (-0.8) for a range of 2. 13. Each score was 
then used in the present study to compare the average ratings of early 
and recent vice presidents. The average effectiveness scores for these 
two groups were as follows: 
Early Vice Presidents (1877-1953) 
Recent Vice Presidents (1953-1979) 
-0.003 
0.04 
Given the possible range of scores this difference would not indicate 
great improvement in selection of vice presidents. This is not too sur-
prising when one considers that the most i'mportant criterion for select-
ing vice presidential candidates has been the same for all vice presi-
dents rated in the study. That criterion is how well the running mate 
balances the ticket. Perhaps if vice presidential candidates had more 
important asslgnments during the campaign (such as debating the other 
candidate as in 1976 between Mondale and Dole), the demographic char-
acteristics of the candidates would start counting for less. The lack 
of improvement in vice presidents is also traced to presidential candi-
dates since they have been delegated the power of making the selection. 
Given this prerogative, presidents must be held accountable for opting 
for candidates because of their vote getting strength rather than high 
moral and intellectual qualities. They could defend their selections 
on the grounds that they must operate under a great deal of constraints 
and that it is not easy to persuade high caliber individuals to take the 
job. Still, one wonders if presidential egos could withstand highly in-
telligent, ambitious, and experienced running mates. Presidents cannot 
fire vice presidents and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gives the vice pres-
ident and a majority of the cabinet the authority to declare a president 
unable to govern (making the vice pres.ident ''acting president 11). 12 Thus, 
the lack of improvement in vice presidential selection may also be due to 
the lack of improvement in selecting presidential nominees. Higher cal-
iber presidential nominees should, for several reasons, result in the 
selection of higher caliber running mates. First, such a candidate 
should find it ea~ier to persuade a greater number of individuals to ac-
cept what has been considered an unattractive position. If the trend of 
recent years continues and vice presidents increasingly become presiden-
tial nominees or presidents, this should also contribute to presidential 
nominees finding more candidates from which to pick. Second, a higher 
caliber candidate could select a higher caliber running mate without 
feeling threatened by doing so. Using the Chicago Tribune's (1982) 
presidential ratings with the Wendt and Muncy vice presidential ratings, 
it appears that higher rated presidents do select high rated vice pres-
idents. Using the scores for the 24 vice presidents rated, the average 
effectiveness score for each presidential grouping appears below. The 
titles, "Great, Near Great. .. '' were not used in the Chicago Tribune 
poll (the actual scores from that poll appear in the parenthesis fol-
lowing each title). 
Presidential 
Ratings 
Great (883-1, 086) 
Near Great (741-836) 
Average (461-728) 
Below Average (350-452) 
Failure (319-329) 







Still unanswered is the question of the relationship of being a 
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good vice president (however rare they may be) to being a good president. 
To answer this question, the 24 vice presidents rated in the Wendt and 
. 13 
Muncy study were categorized into 11Good, 11 11 Fair, 11 and 11 Poor. 11 Of those 
placed in the 11Good 11 and 11 Fair 11 category, three became president from 
each; of those rated 11Poor, 11 only one became president. Their subsequent 
ratings as ~resident based on the scores received in the Chicago Tribune 





Good ......................... 858 
Fair ......................... 552 
Poor ......................... 417 
The average score of 858 is, for comparison purposes, closest to the 
overall rating given Harry Truman. The 552 score is closest to Chester 
Arthur and the 417 score represents Richard Nixon, the single individual 
in this category. These scores are based on a limited number of presi-
dents and vice presidents; however, assuming they reflect merely a rough 
generalization would be enough to stress the importance (particularly at 
a time when the vice presidency is increasingly serving as a 11stepping 
stone 11 to the presidency) that should be attached to the selection of 
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vice presidents. The data also indicate that 60% of the vice presidents 
from the "Good" category were nominated for president while only 9% from 
the 11 Poor 11 category were so nominated. \~hile this may be viewed as en-
couraging, it should be noted that the 60% figure is mostly accidental 
since all those nominated for president first succeeded to the presidency 
and thus had a much better chance of obtaining the nomination. The low 
percentage of "poor•• vice presidents nominated for president should also 
be understood as reflecting not so much the tendency for the parties to 
discriminate between vice presidents as to generally forget them (regard-
less of their performance) when selecting presidential nominees (except, 
as mentioned above, those who succeed to the presidency). 
The Vice Presidency and Five 
Presidential Qualities 
When conducting the Chicago Tribune poll, Steve Neal asked there-
spondents to rate the presidents on five qualities: leadership ability, 
accomplishments and crisis management, political skill, appointments, 
and character and integrity. Although the data cited earlier indicated 
that experience as vice president did not contribute to a higher over-
all rating for presidents, it might be that a particular quality of our 
presidents is enhanced as a result of this experience. To see if presi-
dents with vice presidential experience scored higher on these five 
qualities, Table VII was compiled. The scores do not vary a great deal; 
however, in three out of five instances the presidents with the longest 
terms as vice president averaged less than those who had never been vice 
president. On the accomplishments/crisis management and political skills 
qualities, just the opposite was true. The biggest difference in scores 
TABLE VII 
AVERAGE RATINGS OF PRESIDENTS BY 
VICE PRESIDENTIAL EXPERIENCE 
Chicago 
















Vice President Vice President 











1 Pre-Twelfth Amendment presidents are not included. 
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occurred with the political skill quality. The vice presidency does not 
appear to be contributing to the formation of better presidents as much 
as it is to the formation of better politicians. This is not necessarily 
bad. Jimmy Carter, who some argued was too idealistic, ranked 30th on 
this quality, and could have used a course in politicking. Th~ top rat-
ed president in this category was Abraham Lincoln. But, considering the 
relatively lower scores on leadership, political appointments, and char-
acter and integrity which this group of presidents receives raises addi-
tional questions concerning the value of the vice presidency. 
Summary 
One of the reasons for retaining the office of the vice presidency 
is that the office serves as a 11 training ground 11 or apprenticeship for 
the presidency. Serving in this office, it is argued, is the best pre-
paration one could have as preparation for assuming the presidency .. One 
historian, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., argues that the vice presidency not 
only fails to prepare individuals for the presidency, but it is a maim-
ing experience. 
In an attempt to resolve the differences of opinions, the ratings 
of presidents with previous vice presidential experience were compared 
with those who had no such experience. In addition, other political ex-
periences were compared with these scores (serving as governor and in 
Congress). The results tend to support Schlesinger 1 s argument or, at 
least, refute the argument that the vice presidency is the best position 
from which to become acquainted with the presidency. The highest ratings 
were for those presidents who had previously served as governors; the 
worst were for those who had served as vice president for more than two 
years. 
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The counter argument that recent vice presidents are of a higher 
caliber was also tested using the same data and found to be only insig-
nificantly supported. The 11 root'' of the problem lies in the caliber of 
individuals selected as presidential nominees. Selection of better cand-
idates here should improve the quality of individuals selected for vice 
president. 
Does experience as vice president contribute anything to those who 
later become president? The data indicate that presidents with this ex-
perience do average higher scores in political skill. This is not in 
itself a negative finding, but could be so interpreted in light of the 
other findings of this study. 
The findings in this study are in no way conclusive, but given the 
circumstances behind the creation of the vice presidency and the history 
of its development, nothing less than inconclusive findings contradict-
ing those reported would justify retaining the office. 
Two of the major reasons given for retaining the vice presidency 
have been empirically tested in the last three chapters. One chapter 
has also discussed various proposals for changing the office and what 
the effects of each might be. One major area remains to be examined--
presidential succession. The next chapter examines this top~c, using 
as a focal point the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Of particular importance 
in this chapter is the question of the desirability of a caretaker re-
gime. This is important because given the findings of the previous 
chapters, it appears that the major arguments for retaining or reform-
ing the vice presidency are groundless. If one is to consider 
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abolishing the office, however, consideration must be given to the one 
function which has so preoccupied those who have studied the office. ·Fur-
thermore, abo] ishment of the office would, most likely, result in the cre-
ation of a caretaker regime when a presidential vacancy occurred. The 
next chapter discusses these important subjects. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION AND THE VICE PRESIDENCY 
On July 6, 1965, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States was proposed by Congress. The proposed amendment dealt 
primarily with presidential disability and vice presidential vacancy. 
Prior to the proposed amendment several presidents had been disabled and 
the vice presidential office had been vacant 16 times. On February 23, 
1967, the proposed amendment was declared ratified. Section Two provided 
for the filling of vice presidential vacancies. Seven years later Sec-
tion Two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had been invoked twice. 
For over two years the United States had a presidentanda vice presi-
dent, neither of whom had faced election to those offices. After the re-
signation of Spiro Agnew, Richard Nixon nominated Gerald Ford to be Vice 
President. Following the resignation of Nixon, Ford became President, 
and he nominated Nelson Rockefeller for Vice President. Thus, Gerald 
Ford was President, although never being elected except by the majority 
of voters of a single congressional district in Michigan. His Vice Presi-
dent, Nelson Rockefeller, had unsuccessfully attempted to win his party•s 
presidential nomination on three occasions. Both came into power through 
the process outlined in Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Neither 
the principal author nor the other members of Congress voting on this sec-
tion conceived of this ever happening. It was not brought up during the 
congressional hearings nor debated on the floor. 
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This does not automatically condemn the amendment. For some it does 
not even justify criticism. As former Senator Birch Bayh has stated, 
11 Compared to many issues of the day, presidential succession and disabil-
1 
ity had little legislative sex appeal} 1 Several important criticisms 
have been directed toward the amendment--the undemocratic nature of fill-
ing vice presidential vacancies; not providing for time limits; and lack 
of provision for other contingencies--to name a few. What was the ration-
ale behind Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and how has that sec-
tion worked in practice? Perhaps after years of trying, the United States 
has satisfactorily solved the problem of presidential succession. Perhaps 
not. This chapter will attempt to answer these questions. Before detail-
ing the rationale behind Section Two, a brief history of presidential sue-
cession is in order. 
The History of Presidential Succession 
Only one written plan for presidential succession was submitted to 
the Constitutional Convention in 1787; This was the Pinkney Plan. It 
contained the following: 
In case of his [the President 1 s] removal, death, resignation, 
or disability, the President of the Senate shall exercise the 
duties of his office until ano-ther President be chosen--and in 
case of the death of the President of the Senate the Speaker · 
of the House of Delegates shall do so .... 2 
A similar plan was voiced by Alexander Hamilton at the Convention: 11 0n 
the death, resignation, or removal of the Governor, his authorities are 
to be exercised by the President of the Senate ti 11 a successor be ap-
pointed.113 Two points should be made about these two proposals. First, 
the President of the Senate referred to is not the vice president since 
that office had not been brought up yet at the Convention. Second, in 
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both provisions the succession is only temporary, pending the use of some 
other selection method. On September 4, the Committee of Eleven (created 
for difficult problems) made its report: 
... in case of his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resig-
natlon or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his 
office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and du-
ties until another President be chosen, or until the inability 
of the President is removed.4 
The primary difference in this plan and the earlier proposals is that it 
made the vice president heir rather than the President of the Senate. 
Also clear is that the vice president was not to become the president 
(merely exercise powers and duties), although the Committee of Eleven pro-
vided no provision for a special election in case of the president's death 
or removal. 5 
The means of providing a successor when both the office of the presi-
dent and vice president are vacant was also discussed during the Constitu-
tiona] Convention. On August 27, 1787, it was suggested that Congress 
have the power to appoint a successor "until the time of electing!!. Presi-
dent shall arrive." Madison objected to the underscored portion because 
it would make all successors permanent and prevent the holding of "special 
elections." He moved to substitute, and the delegates adopted the follow-
ing: "until such disability be removed, or a President shall be elect-
d ,,6 e . 
The provision for a "single" vacancy and this proposal for a 11 double 11 
vacancy were sent to the Committee of Style. The Committee reported the 
following: 
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his 
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and 
duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the vice-
president, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of 
removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the president 
and vice-president, declaring what officer shall then act as 
president, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the 
disability be removed, or the period for choosing another 
president arrive.? 
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On September 15, a verbal amendment was made changing ••or the period for 
choosing another president arrive•• to the clause found in the Constitu-
tion today, 11 or a President shall be elected (Article II, Section l) . 11 
In summary the following points should be made: 
l. In the event of a 'single' vacancy, the vice president would 
exercise the powers and duties of the presidency but would 
not become president. 
2. In the event of a 'single' vacancy, the vice president would 
act as president until a president was elected. 
3. In the event of a 'double' vacancy, the named successor 
would act as president until a president was elected. 
4. No provision was made for a vacancy in the vice presidency. 
In addition to the provision for succession, the vice president was 
also made presiding officer of the Senate and given a tie-breaking vote. 
Of these two constitutional powers, succession was the more important. 
This was especially true following the first instance of presidential sue-
cession. 
The Tyler Precedent: The First 11 Single11 Vacancy 
John Tyler, the first individual to succeed to the presidency, af-
forded a definitive (although questionably accurate) interpretation of 
the constitutional language pertaining to succession. 8 Tyler believed 
that''· the same shall devolve on the vice president ... 11 (Article II, 
Section l) referred to the office of the president rather than just the 
powers and duties of the office. He became the new president and regard-
ed the procedure of a special election applicable only to instances of 
double . 9 vacancies. Tyler settled the issue concerning the status of a 
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vice president succeeding to the presidency. As far as Tyler was concern-
ed, there was to be no special election. 
Presidential Succession Acts 
Article I I, Section l of the Constitution provides that when there 
is a vacancy in both the presidency and vice presidency, Congress may by 
law provide for a successor. Acting under this constitutional authority, 
Congress passed the first Presidential Succession Act in 1792. That act 
named the President of the Senate pro tempore as the immediate successor. 
If there were no President pro tempore, then the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives would succeed to the presidency. According to the Act, 
either successor was to act as President until the disability be removed 
or a president be elected. Since these designated successors were only 
temporary, the act also provided for a 11 special election11 to be held to 
elect a new president and vice president. This congressional endorsement 
of a 11 special election11 in the act is very significant. In light of the 
fact that several men supporting this 1792 act were present during the 
writing of the Constitution, it is hard to question the constitutionality 
of such a provision. 
The 1792 Presidential Succession Act went unchallenged for several 
years; however, certain events raised doubts about the value of the Act.' 
The impeachment of Andrew Johnson underlined the danger of designating 
the President pro tempore of the Senate, a member of the tribunal by whose 
decrees a vacancy may be produced, as heir to the presidency. 1° Follow-
ing the death of President Garfield, another flaw in the Act was high-
lighted. Since congressional sessions were not the lengthy ones we 
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experience today, Congress was not in session and therefore no successor 
existed in the event something happened to Vice President Arthur. 11 
These defects and a recurrence of the lack of a successor during the 
Cleveland administration, when Vice President Hendricks died and Congress 
had not convened, resulted in the Presidential Succession Act of 1886. 
This Act placed the heads of the cabinet departments (in order of their 
creation, beginning with the Secretary of State) as successors in the 
event of a 11 double vacancy. 11 The Act also allowed a 11 special election•• 
to be held. 
The 1886 law remained unchanged until President Truman succeeded to 
the presidency after the death of Franklin Roosevelt. President Truman 
delivered a special message to Congress proposing changes in the 1886 law. 
11That old act,•• he said, ••gave the President power to appoint his own suc-
cessor, in the person of the Secretary of State.•• 12 In Truman•s opinion 
the office of the President should be filled by an elected, not appointed, 
official. After several unsuccessful attempts to revise the presidential 
succession law during the Truman administration, Congress passed the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1947. The Act provided that whenever there 
was a vacancy in the presidency and vice presidency, the line of succes-
sian began with the Speaker of the House. If there were no Speaker of the 
House, the President pro tempore of the Senate would act as President. 
Finally, if there were no President pro tempore, the cabinet officers (be-
ginning with the Secretary of State and continuing in the order of estab-
1 ishment) would act as President. Contrary to Truman 1 s wishes, Congress 
did not include a ••special election•• provision in the 1947 Act. 
Although all three Presidential Succession Acts provided for succes-
sion beyond the Vice President, succession has never proceeded further 
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than the vice president. None of the Acts has ever been used because 
there has never been a "double" vacancy. However, the succession of 
Lyndon Johnson to the presidency in 1963 marked the sixteenth time the 
vice presidency had been vacant. These vacancies totaled more than 37 
years or nearly one-fifth of the history of the United States. 
Development of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
Shortly after the death of President Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, the 
Vice President, was sworn into office and became the thirty-third Presi-
dent. He served without a vice president, however, because neither the 
Constitution nor the Presidential Succession Act provided for the filling 
of vice presidential vacancies. 
As Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, 
Birch Bayh introduced on December 12, 1963, a resolution that provided, 
among other things, for the filling of vacancies in the vice presidency. 13 
Although Congress adjourned before action could be taken on this resolu-
tion, Congress did pass a resolution acceptable to both chambers on 
July 6, 1965, and within two years the proposed amendment was ratified. 
The section pertaining to vice presidential vacancies (Section Two) pro-
vided the following: "Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the 
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall 
take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both houses of Con-
gress.'' Two successive implementations of this section resulted in an 
. . . d d . . d l 4 Th . h . . · appo1nt1ve pres1 ent an v1ce pres1 ent. IS somew at surpr1s1ng Situ-
ation led the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments to hold hearings 
examining the workings of Section Two. 15 
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Promise and Performance 
The preceding discussion of the history of presidential succession 
and development of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment ignored the basic rationale 
behind the Amendment. Before critically examining the only two occur-
rences of the use of Section Two, some discussion on this rationale is in 
order. Why was Section Two written to provide for presidential nomina-
tion and congressional confirmation? 
Rat i anal e 
''Whenever there .!2..!!. vacancy ~.the office of the Vice President, 
the President shall nominate a Vice President. .. 11 (emphasis 
mine). 
Section Two gives the initiative for fi !ling vice presidential vacan-
cies to the President. During the hearings and debate it was proposed that 
Congress, or perhaps only those members of Congress of the same party as 
the President, be given the initiative for selection. The President could 
then exercise his veto if not satisfied with the congressional choice. 
Support for this method comes from the contingency plans for electing a 
president or vice president when one or both do not receive a majority of 
electoral college votes. Reliance on presidential initiative won the day 
for several reasons. First, the most important and frequently mentioned 
support of presidential (and for that matter the entire Section Two) was 
that the vice president must be someone with whom the president can work. 
Allowing the president to have the initiative in vice presidential selec-
tion is, it was argued, the best method for insuring "harmony.'' Second, 
there is somewhat of a precedent for allowing this method. Both major 
100 
parties in the United States allow their presidential nominees to select 
their running mates at the national conventions. Third, this method in-
sures that the vice president will be of the same party as the president. 
Finally, all of these factors taken together mean that should a vice 
president selec~ed under Section Two succeed to the presidency, continu-
ity would be provided. During the Senate debates of September 28, 1964, 
Birch Bayh stated, ''By this means, it is virtually assured that the Vice 
President will continue to be a man in whom the President has full confi-
dence and a man of the same political party and political philosophy." 16 
No time limit was placed onthe nomination process, although some 
were proposed during the debate and have been advocated since. 
11 ••• shall take office upon confirmation £1.~ majority vote of 
both Houses~ Congress .. 11 (emphasis mine). 
The appointment of a vice president was to be atyp i ca 1 of other pres i-
dential appointments. This was because of the unique role that was to be 
played by members of Congress. The Congress was to act for the entire 
electorate with each representative and senator casting a vote as an elec-
tor (the 535 members approximate the electoral college except for the 
three votes given Washington, D.C. by the Twenty-Third Amendment). This 
role ("surrogate electors") is unlike the "advise and consent" role estab-
1 ished by the Constitution for Senate confirmation of officers. The con-
firmation process would also allow a deliberate and extensive examination 
of the nominee's qualifications. Birch Bayh stated in the Senate debates 
of February 19, 1965, 
It would provide for a Vice President who would have received a 
vote of confidence and would have been, in fact, elected by the 
Members of both Houses who have the responsibility for being 
close to the people and knowing what they desire and expressing 
their wishes in Congress. 17 
l 0 l 
Congress is to represent the people in electing a new vice president. 
1 8 This responsibility is quantitatively different than any other. 
In summary the rationale supporting Section Two of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment is as follows: 
1. It insures a vice president of the same party. 
2. It insures continuity should an appointed vice president 
succeed to the presidency. 
3. It insures harmony between the presidential-vice presiden-
tial team. 
4. It allows the Congress to act as •surrogate voters,• thus 
indirectly giving the electorate a voice in the selection 
of the vice president. 
All other proposals for filling vice presidential vacancies were dis-
missed on the grounds that the above goals (which are very similar to 
those 1 isted in Chapter IV) were not met. Do the Hrst and only two in-
stances of the implementation of Section Two confirm or dispel this ra-
tionale? 
Surrogate Electors 
There appears to be a contradiction voiced by those supporting con-
gress i ona 1 confirmation with the congressmen and senators acting as 11s ur-
rogate electors•• expressing the wishes of their constituent voters. On 
the one hand, one might suppose that if this is the role that congressmen 
are to adopt, then the vote would somewhat para] lei party strength in the 
Congress. After all, at election time voters are exercising a political 
.. 
function. Likewise, if congressmen are acting for the public in ''elect-
ing" a vice president, it would not be unusual for party politics to be-
come involved. Indeed, it would be anticipated. Furthermore, although 
Congress lacks the party discipline that characterizes parliamentary 
governments, there are some issues that are more likely to elicit party 
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cohesion. Jewell and Patterson have noted that issues involving the pres-
tige and fundamental programs of the administration and issues involving 
the special interests of the parties are more likely to evoke partisan 
voting. 19 A major appointment like that of vice president certainly in-
valves the prestige of a president. The vice president, if confirmed, 
will become a spokesman of the administration, President of the Senate, 
and most important, potential heir to the presidency. Since the nomina-
tion will be of interest to both major parties, it is suspectedthatparty 
cohesion will be evident. 
Yet the same individuals voicing support of the Congress acting as 
11 surrogate electors 11 have argued that partisan politics should be el imin-
ated from the process: 
I have more faith in the Congress acting in an emergency in the 
white heat of publicity, with American people looking on. The 
last thing Congress would dare to do would be to become involv-
ed in a purely political move (emphasis mine) .20 
While this quotation has stronger partisan tones than suggested in the 
above discussion, it is apparent from the hearings and debate that the 
11white heat of publicityl 1 would prevent politics entering the confirma-
tion and at the same time speed the process. One cannot have it both 
ways. 
Examination of the voting on the Ford and Rockefeller confirmations 
allays any doubts about partisan politics playing a part in the confirma-
tion process and at the same time raises doubts about the possibility of 
congressmen and senators acting as 11 surrogate electors 11 (see Table VIII). 
One would have to agree with Schlesinger, in his observation that it seems 
improbable that any popular election would have given Ford and Rocke-





CONGRESSIONAL VOTE ON CONFIRMAT.ON OF VICE 
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES BY PARTY 
House Senate 
Democrat Repub I i can Democrat Republican 
201 186 52 40 
35 0 3 0 
Rockefeller 
For 134 153 53 37 
Against 99 29 4 3 
Source: Con~Fess i ona I Quarterly, Vol. 21 (November 27, I 973) ; 









Congress did not act as a 11 surrogate electorate,'' but was guided by the 
advise and consent function given for cabinet, judicial, and other superi-
or officers. 
Harmony or Continuity? 
That presidential nominees determine, in effect, their vice presiden-
tial running mates weighed heavily in giving the president the initiative 
in filling vice presidential vacancies. As was pointed out in Chapter 
Ill, more often than not presidential nominees select vice presidential 
running mates who serve in some way to ''balance the ticket. 11 As one con-
gressman stated, 11Whether they should or not, they will not, in the final 
analysis, choose their vice presidential candidate to succeed them; they 
will choose them to help them succeed. 1122 Wi 11 presidents use this power 
in the same way that presidential nominees have used it? According to 
the rationale supporting Section Two, the answer would be no. In order 
to test this question, three areas of possible balance were selected 
(based on historical balances). 
Ideology 
The ideology of Nixon, Ford, and Rockefeller was defined by respec-
tive ADA ratings. The ratings were available for Gerald Ford up until 
the time he became a nominee. Using the votes on which the ADA rated Con~ 
gress for 1971 and 1973, and comparing the position favored by the ADA 
and the position taken by President Nixon, an approximate ADA score was 
tabulated. Similarly, an approximate ADA score was derived for Nelson 
Rockefeller. Using this measure, Nixon's ADA rating was 7, Ford's was 
11, and Rockefeller was far removed from the former with a rating of 70. 
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Another measurement was undertaken attempting to demonstrate similar-
ity or dissimilarity in political beliefs. A list of issues was selected 
and a general agreement or disagreement score was noted. The position 
for Mr. Nixon was determined from the Public Papers and 11The Public Re-
cord of Richard Nixon. 1123 The position for Mr. Ford was taken from the 
"Analysis of the Philosophy and Voting Record of Representative Gerald R. 
Ford, Nominee for Vice President of the United States'' and from his vot-
. d 24 
1 ng recor . Mr. Rockefeller's views were obtained from a report pre-
pared by the Congressional Research Service: "Analysis of the Philosophy 
and Public Record of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Nominee for Vice President of 
the United States. 1125 The data are given in Table IX. The broad issues 
listed in this table are the ones addressed by the Library of Congress 
study on Mr. Ford and Mr. Rockefeller. Because each issue is so broad, 
it was possible for a positive scoreonone specific policy and a negative 
score on another specific policy within each issue. If this occurred, a 
score of "ambivalent" was recorded in the table. Otherwise the men were 
rated according to the preponderance of specific pol icy positions within 
each issue. 
While one might question the existence of an ideological balance be-
tween Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, based on the ADA ratings and pol icy 
positions, certainly the difference between Ger~ld Ford and Nelson Rocke-
feller is gre~t enough to label it a balance. The lack of balance in 
ideology between Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford could be attributed to 
many factors. When nominating Ford, though, Nixon had the concerns of 
Watergate, and he had been elected to the presidency his second time (and 
thus reached the constitutional limit). There was no need, therefore, to 
select a more liberal nominee in hopes of gaining a potential electoral 
TABLE IX 
POSITION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL 





Issues Nixon Ford (Yes-No) Rocke fe 11 e r (Yes-No) 
ABM + + y + y 
Abortion + N + y 
Atomic Energy + + y + y 
Balanced Budget + + y + y 
Busing y 0 N 
Capital Punish-
ment + + y N 
civil Rights + N + N 
Drug Control + + y + y 
Aid to Education + 0 N + N 
Election Reform + + y + y 
Executive Privi-
1 ege + + y + y 
Food Shortage X + N 
Foreign Policy + + y + y 
Gun Control + N + y 
Housing + N + N 
Impoundment + + y 0 N 
Minimum Wage + N + N 
National Health 
Insurance X + + y 
0 i 1 Imports X + N 
Prayers in Pub-
l i c Schools X + + y 
Revenue Sharing + + y + y 
Tax Reform + 0 N + N 
Pollution Control + + y + y 
SST + + y 0 N 
Wage and Price 
Controls y y 
\.Je l form Reform + + y + y 
Women 1 s Rights + + y + y 
Agreement Nixon-Ford = 70% 
Agreement Ford- Rocke fe l l er 59% 
+ For. 
Against. 
0 Amb iva 1 en t. 
X Not ava i lab 1 e. 
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edge in a forthcoming election. Gerald Ford, on the other hand, selected 
the man who, in all probability, appeared to be his likely running mate 
in 1976 when he nominated Nelson Rockefeller. An ideological balance 
would appeal to the ideological differences within the Republican party 
and between the parties. With his definite decision to enter the 1976 
election, it is evident ideology was an important factor in Ford's selec-
tion of a vice presidential nominee. 
Geography 
Another political consideration of presidential nominees in select-
ing a running mate is a geographical "balancing of the ticket." Using 
birthplace, residence, and areas of political participation to determine 
geographical areas, both vice presidential nominees balanced their respec-
tive presidents. Nixon, from the West, chose a midwesterner, who in turn 
selected Nelson Rockefel~er, an established easterner. 
Character 
The early classification of presidents relied on categories such as 
"weak" or "strong" with very little clarification of the criteria used 
for either. Recently, more sophisticated typologies concerning presiden-
tial character have been developed. 26 Barber's typology relies on the 
following classifications: active-positive, active-negative, passive-
positive, and passive-negative. If "character" is as important in deter-
mining behavior of a president, as Barber and others would have us be-
lieve, then the "character" of a potential heir to the presidency becomes 
important. Defenders of Section Two would argue that the best method for 
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insuring harmony and continuity is to give the president the power to se-
lect the vice president. Has this been confirmed by the two occurrences 
of vice presidential nomination? 
To test this rationale each president and vice president nominee was 
labeled as either active or inactive using several criteria: the number 
of governmental offices and positions held or contested; the number of 
governmental proposals initiated; strict activity (example: working or 
campaigning long hours). Relying on these indices, Richard Nixon would 
be labeled an 11active11 president. 27 Nixon held several governmental 
offices and contested several others. He was a member of the House of 
Representatives from 1946 to 1950, and was a United States Senator from 
1950 to 1952. In 1952, Nixon became Vice President and succesfully ran 
again with Eisenhower in 1956. Nixon campaigned vigorously in 1960 for 
the presidency. As part of his campaign strategy, he promised to visit 
all 50 states before the election. Two years later Nixon lost his bid 
for the governorship of his home state of California. He was elected 
President in 1968, and defeated George McGovern in the 1972 election. 
Nixon sponsored several pieces of legislation during his membership 
in the House and Senate. He sponsored 47 bills and cosponsored 28 others 
from 1947 to 1952. 28 He initiated many governmental proposals as Presi-
dent. During his third year as President, Nixon proposed his six great 
goals: revenue ~haring, welfare reform, executive reorganization, health 
insurance, environmental protection, and economic prosperity. These facts 
indicate an active political career. 
The career pattern for Nixon 1 s vice presidential appointee, however, 
is quite different. Ford was elected to the House of Representatives in 
1949. He was re-elected until his nomination to the vice presidency in 
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1973. 
29 His I ifelong political dream was to become Speaker of the House. 
He was not considered an active congressman. Although he was a member of 
Congress for 25 years, not one major bi II ever came out of Congress under 
h . . 30 IS name or aeg1s. Representatives from both parties criticized Ford 
for his lack of leadership in the House of Representatives and other pol i-
ticians were critical of his inactivity as Vice President and President.3l 
It should be noted that Gerald Ford was House Minority Leader from 1963 
until becoming Nixon 1 s Vice President. Yet, the acquisition of that lead-
ership position had I ittle to do with Ford 1 s activity. As terHorst has 
argued: 
In selecting Ford as Hoeven 1 s successor, the Young Turks picked 
an easy-going, pipe-smoking man whose prime qualification was 
that he knew he had few enemies in the House. Ford had not 
clawed his way to the top of the heap, nor had he demonstrated 
such charismatic leadership that supporters clamored to do his 
bidding.32 
The number of political positions held by Nelson Rockefeller is quite 
extensive. 33 In addition, Rockefeller sought the Republican nomination 
for the presidency on several occasions. As Governor of New York from 
1959 to 1973, Rockefeller initiated many programs such as the State Con-
sumer Protection Board, no-fault insurance, a large-scale construction 
program to rehabilitate prison facilities, and he created the nation 1 s 
first State Counci I on the Arts. 
Based on these facts and the indices rei ied upon, the following pat-
tern occurs: an 11 active11 Nixon selected an 11 inactive11 Ford, who chose 
Rockefeller, an 11active 11 politician. 
The data, then, appear to indicate that of the four major reasons 
justifying Section Two, only one has been confirmed in the two instances 
of filling a vice presidential vacancy. Both Richard Nixon and Gerald 
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Ford did nominate vice presidents of the same political party. As demon-
strated earlier, Congress did not act as 11 surrogate electors, 11 but was 
directed by the 11advise and consent 11 function given to the Senate on all 
other nominations of superior officers. It has also been shown that both 
presidents nominated vice presidents who 11 balanced11 many of their charac-
teristics. This reliance on a balance i~ not what the supporters of Sec-
tion Two envisioned. In fact, it is a major attack on the rationale sup-
porting presidential nomination of vice presidents. 
Proposals for Change 
Section Two of the Amendment has not worked as was intended and there 
is no reason to believe it will work any differently in the future. Sev-
eral suggestions have been put forward for improving it. 
First, it has been proposed that a time 1 imit be placed on the nomin-
ation and confirmation of a vice presidential appointment. In late 1974, 
President Ford remarked, 11 ln this dangerous age . we need a vice presi-
dent at all times, and I speak as one who ought to know. 1134 The confirma-
tion of Gerald Ford took 55 days while that for Nelson Rockefeller took 
121 days. Birch Bayh, among others, vehemently opposed any time limit. 
After the first two appointments, Bayh stated, 11 Both Senator Ervinandmy-
self talked about the folly of setting a time 1 imit on the search for 
truth. 1135 Another related proposal woulli require joint confirmation hear-
ings. This would, it is argued, expedite the process and at the same time 
allow each house to vote separately. The American Bar Association endors-
ed this proposal in a report issued in June, 1974. 36 
A second group of reforms are more extreme than those discussed above. 
In the ninety-fourth Congress, Senator John Pastore introduced a 
lll 
resolution that would have restored, in his mind, some democracy to the 
procedure for filling vice presidential vacancies; Pastore 1 s proposal 
provided that Section Two would be inoperative in the event a vice presi-
dent, appointed under that provision, succeeded to the presidency. In 
that case, a special election would be held to elect a new president and 
vice president for the remainder of the existing term (if at least one 
year remained). He stated that the purpose of his proposal was to allow 
the voice of the people to be expressed through an election should the 
situation ever arise when an appointed vice president succeeds to the 
presidency. 37 This proposal would remedy the situation found repugnant 
to so many in 1976: an appointed president and vice president. Another 
proposal, related to this one, would use special elections only under dif-
ferent circumstances. Senator Hathaway proposed, 
that in the case of a vacancy occurring in the office of 
both the president and the vice president, there will be a spe-
cial election with the highest ranking officer of the House of 
Representatives of the same party as the outgoing presideot 
serving as acting presid~nt until such election is held.3~ 
Criticisms of these proposals focus on their creation of a 11caretaker11 
regime and the undesirability of a special election. The same criticisms 
apply to the proposal to abolish the vice presidency (assuming some provi-
sion for a temporary successor and a subsequent special election). Given 
the findings in this and previous chapters, it is important to discuss 
these criticisms. 
Special Elections and Caretaker Regimes 
Section One of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment precludes the use of a spe-
cial election when a president dies, resigns, or is removed from office. 
The section makes Tyler 1 s precedent constitutional, and thus grants a 
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succeeding vice president presidential status. Given a president through 
this method, there is no need for a special election to elect one. 
This is not what the Founding Fathers intended. This is Tyler's in-
terpretation of Article I I, Section I, paragraph 6, and Birch Bayh has 
stated that Tyler probably ignored what our Founding Fathers thought. 39 
They intended for the succeeding vice president to act as president until 
40 
a president could be chosen. This points out a philosophical justifica-
tion for advocacy of special elections, especially when succession goes 
r 
beyond the vice president. The questions of practicality and feasibility 
remain, but surely what takes precedence in this instance is a belief in 
democratic principles. While few might deny that selecting national lead-
ers by inheritance would be less bothersome than periodic/popular elec-
tions, such a pol icy is fundamentally undemocratic. In short, easiest is 
not always best (nor is it always the most practical). Speaking of the 
power to fil I a vacancy in the vice presidency through presidential ap-
pointment, then, Congressman Charles Mathias stated, "I oppose such power 
as being in conflict with the basic principles of the Republic and the 
philosophy of the Constitution which tends to disperse, rather than to 
41 centralize power." 
One of the major concerns voiced with the use of special elections 
is the inability of an acting president to perform executive duties in an 
efficient and credible manner. This concern over a "caretaker" regime is 
one that should be taken seriously. The pressing problems is domestic 
and foreign pol icy demand an administration that commands the respect of 
the Congress and the public. \~ould that respect for an acting president 
be forthcoming? Since the United States has never witnessed an acting 
president, any answer must rely on speculation; however, it is possible 
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to get a general indication by examining the closest thing--a succeeding 
vice president. 42 Table X illustrates the percentage of approval ratings 
for every Gallup poll since the succession of Harry Truman. 43 Surprising-
ly, the highest approval rating average occurs with the first year succes-
sors. When the subsequent four-year terms of these successors are includ-
ed, the approval rating drops about 10 percentage points. This suggests 
a 11 honeymoon 11 period, but all of the figures are relatively high and close. 
These data suggest that the closest thing the United States has to com-
pare to an acting president has not had a problem with approval ratings. 
It should be noted that Gerald Ford's ratings are lower than the other 
successors. One could argue that this is because of the particular way 
in which Ford became Vice President. Acceptance of this argument could 
lead one to condemn the method of selection. Another argument is that an 
acting president would receive even worse approval ratings. Again, the 
closest evidence is presented in Table X. That evidence suggests that 
succeeding vice presidents do not experience exceptional first year (or 
full term) credibility gaps with the public. In fact, for the first year 
just the opposite holds true. 
An acting president (before a special election would be held) would 
reduce the probability of low approval ratings. Although approval rat-
ings may remain relatively high, anyone succeeding to the presidency 
raises the question of what role the successor will play. Will the sue-
cesser serve as caretaker? Will the successor initiate new and different 
policies? This uncertainty would be reduced if the public knew a succes-
sor would act as president until an election could be held. It would be 
easier for the pub] ic, Congress, and the successor to know that a defin-
ite role was expected of the one succeeding. 
11 4 
TABLE X 
AVERAGE APPROVAL RATINGS OF PRESIDENTS, 1945-1977 
Over a 11 
First Year Over a 11 for Successor First Year for 
Fo 11 owing Elected Elected Following Elected 
Succession (%) Terms (%) Terms (%) E 1 ect ion (T) Terms ( ~~) 
Truman 67.3 Lf 7. 2 53.7 47.5 40.8 
Eisenhower 
1952 68.0 68.9 
1956 62.6 60.2 
Kennedy 75.6 70.2 
Johnson 79.0 62.8 74.0 66.0 51.6 
Nixon 
1968 61.6 56.9 
1972 40.2 36.4 
Ford 45.7 45.8 
Carter 64.1 1 49.6 2 
Average 64.0 55.0 57.8 60.7 54.3 
1As of November, 1 'J77. 
2As of January, 1980. 
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For those who still could not live with a policy allowing acting 
presidents, it should be noted that both the Constitution and the 1947 
Presidential Succession Act provide for acting presidents. Sections 
Three and Four of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provide for an acting presi-
dent whenever the president becomes disabled. Most of what is contained 
in these sections is provided for in the original text of the Constitu-
tion, but again, Tyler's precedent led to confusion over implementation. 
The 1947 Presidential Succession Act also specifies, "If there is neither 
a President nor Vice President, then the Speaker of the House shall act 
as President. 1144 
Birch Bayh is opposed to the use of special elections for the follow-
ing reasons: (1) delay, (2) departure from quadrennial presidential elec-
tions, (3) cost, and (4) divisive partisan effect on the country at a time 
h • . d d 45 wen un1ty IS most nee e . Al 1 these concerns have possible remedies. 
As part of the mechanics of a special election law, Congress could estab-
lish a 1 imit on the length and cost of the election. Limitations on cam-
paign spending have already been used in presidential elections. Con-
gress could also set a time limit on the whole process. Because they 
have no vice president, the French use special elections with a 35-day 
time 1 imit on the entire process. Noting that this procedure has worked 
well for the French, Schlesinger has stated, "Short campaigns, federally 
46 financed, would be a blessing-infinitely appreciated by the electorate." 
Regarding the concern over the departure from quadrennial presidential 
elections, this is a question open to constitutional interpretation with 
most evidence supporting a specially elected president serving only the 
remainder of a term. The constitutional language used pertaining to 
presidents is the same as that used with members of Congress, and it is 
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not questioned that congressmen elected in special elections serve only 
until the regular term expires. Why should the presidency be unique in 
this regard? Finally, there is the question of special elections occur-
ring during times when the country is in need of unity. If events dic-
tated when elections would be held, elections occurring during national 
emergencies or crises would be postponed. Thus, the 1944 presidential 
election very likely should have been postponed because of the possible 
divisiveness it could have created. On the other hand, one could just as 
easily argue that elections can provide the unity needed during emergency 
or crisis situations. 
The most formidable obstacle to special elections in the United 
States is Section One of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Considering that the 
Constitution has been amended only 26 times (and 10 of those in one group), 
it is unlikely that any change is forthcoming in the n.ear future. If such 
an amendment were proposed, why not use the opportunity to abolish the 
vice presidency? This question is discussed in the concluding chapter. 
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and duties of his office, the Vice President shal 1 exercise those powers 
and duties until another President be chosen, or until the inability of 
the President be removed." It was not until later in the Convention that 
the Committee on Style, which had no authority to amend or alter the sub-
stance or meaning of the provisions, combined this phr.ase with the "dou-
ble vacancy" provision creating a single paragraph (Article II, Section l, 
paragraph 6). It was Tyler who later gave his own interpretation to the 
paragraph, although Congress was trying to tell him differently. 
41 Appl ication of XXVth, p. 318. 
42 Gerald Ford's case provides what would have to be an even closer 
type. 
43The data for this table were taken from updated material for Gallup 
polls. 
44John D. Feerick, From Failing Hands (New York, 1965), pp. 318-319. 
45 F· I 1 ' 17 19 1rst mp ementat1on, pp. - . 
46 schlesinger, p. 504. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
The Founding Fathers created the vice presidency for certain rea-
sons. Once created, they assigned this officer two constitutional 
duties. \·Jhi le the wisdom of these men is evident in the longevity of the 
Constitution, the vice presidency has not developed as they intended. Not 
only the office but the succession procedure has also failed to operate 
as they intended. Numerous explanations can be given for why this occur-
red. The development of political parties, and their impact on the elec-
toral process, is a major reasbn for the demise of the vice presidency. 
Other reasons have been discussed in the preceding pages. Given these 
findings, the office is of questionable worth. 
Why not abolish the vice presidency? Several conventional reasons 
exist for not doing so. First, there is what could be called the 11 elec-
tive successor 11 argument. Presidential vacancies do occur, and the vice 
president, as provided in the Constitution, is the immediate successor to 
the presidency. It seems only appropriate that in a government that is 
called democratic, the successor should be an elected official. This 
argument, as pointed out in the preceding chapter, was the reason for 
passing the 1947 Presidential Succession Act. As an elected official, 
the vice president not only remedies presidential vacancies but in such 
a way that gives credibility and legitimacy to the process. 
121 
122 
This reasoning concerning the 11 elective successor11 is indirectly re-
vealed in the concern which presidential candidates show in the selection 
of their vice presidential running mate. Assuming that the voters can be 
11WOn 0Ver11 Or 11 ]0St11 beCaUSe Of thiS Selection, preSidential CandidateS 
search for the running mate whose candidacy will result in the former. 
A second reason for not abolishing the vice presidency is that a vice 
president serves as an apprentice or understudy for the presidency. Like 
the first reason, this one is tied to the succession function. Given the 
constitutional provisions making the vice president the immediate succes-
sor, it makes sense to have someone as best prepared as possible for be-
coming president. This argument is most persuasive when vice presidents 
are given important duties to perform and are actively involved in an ad-
ministration1s day-to-day governing; however, the arguemnt does not de-
pend on this. Even if a vice president is not given important day-to-day 
duties, he would, if nothing else through osmosis, be in a better posi-
tion to become president than another officer. 
Third, if the vice presidency is abolished, who wi II serve as immedi-
ate successor? It is unlikely that a new officer would be created with a 
national constituency like the vice president currently claims. A rather 
substantial change such as abolishing the vice presidency would probably 
be accompanied with some provision for special elections. That would, in 
all probability, result in the. creation, so the argument goes, of a care-
taker regime. Such a regime would be an unfortunate situation for the 
country to be in, particularly, it is argued, at a time of a death, resig-
nation, or removal of a president. 
Other reasons exist for retaining the vice presidency, though none 
are as compelling as the above three. For example, it is argued that 
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since the Founding Fathers in their wisdom saw a need for the vice presi-
dency, the office should be retained. Also, all reform proposals, should 
the vice presidency be abolished, are attacked as having their own parti-
cular pitfalls. The caretaker regime problem has already been mentioned. 
In addition, it is argued that the vice presidency, though deservingly 
criticized in the past, is developing into an important office and is 
attracting higher caliber individuals. 
Every argument given above has been questioned and tested in the 
preceding chapters. As revealed in those chapters, very few of the argu-
ments have been supported by the evidence presented. The conclusions pre-
sented in this study, taken together, lead to the overall conclusion that 
the vice presidency should be abolished. 
Most voters do not vote ''for'' a vice presidential candidate. When a 
presidential candidate announces his choice of running mate, he normally 
loses votes. Even if this were not true, presidents normally select run-
ning mates that are as unlike them as possible in order to attract votes. 
They are constrained only by the fear of dividing the party or leaving 
themselves vulnerable to charges of blatant political use of the office. 
The question is not if they will use the office to attract votes, but 
given that as a political fact, how extreme the balance will be. The sys-
tem encourages balance, and in so doing works against harmony and continu-
ity when succession is necessary. 
When compared with other offices, the vice presidency is not a good 
training ground for the presidency. Executive experience gained from 
serving as governor (especially from a big state) is better preparation 
for the presidency than vice presidential or legislative experience. From 
124 
1868 to 1956, 40 percent of all major party presidential nominees were 
. b . • d 1 governors pr1or to e1ng nominate . 
Promises from presidential nominees aside, vice presidents have not 
been given important day-to-day duties. Even if a president did give a 
vice president such duties, it would be up to the discretion of each sue-
ceeding president to follow or ignore this practice. Neither has there 
been improvement, this century, in the caliber of individuals selected as 
vice president. Since World War I I, the vice presidency has contributed 
two things to its occupant: notoriety and political skill. Given the 
failure of the office in the other areas, however, this finding is rather 
alarming. What this means is that more vice presidents, selected for rea-
sons other than their ability to be president and with backgrounds less 
suited for doing so, are becoming presidential candidates. The mass media 
and its coverage of campaigns and the White House is responsible for the 
notoriety. The political ski 11 probably comes from experiencing the cam-
paign first-hand with the presidential candidate, one of the few occasions 
in which the vice president (or vice presidential candidate) is given an 
active role. 
Why not just seek reforms rather than abolishment? There is a prob-
lem with most reforms. The problem is that most reforms are inextricably 
linked to reforms in the election of the vice president. For example, 
the two general reforms most often mentioned in connection with the vice 
presidency are to give the vice president more important duties or im-
provement of the caliber of individual selected for vice president. Nei-
ther of these reforms is 1 ikely to be adopted unless the election proce-
dure is changed. Presidents are not going to give a vice president (a 
potential rival) the kind of important duties that reformers desire. The 
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reason is because unlike department heads, and officials working in the 
Executive Office, presidents cannot fire vice presidents. That is a com-
bination that results in weakness in the vice presidency. Likewise, the 
ticket balancing tradition is more inclined to result in lesser qualified 
individuals being selected. Any reform drastic enough to remedy these 
problems (such as independent election of a vice president) would violate 
the constraints discussed earlier. Less drastic reforms would hardly be 
worth the bother. 
If the vice presidency were abolished, some method of presidential 
succession would have to be devised. Changes would also have to be made 
in the other areas of constitutional duties performed by the vice presi-
dent: President of the Senate and his role in declaring a president un-
able to perform his powers and duties. One proposal would be to transfer 
these duties (though perhaps the Senate function should be dropped entire-
ly) to the Secretary of State. This successor could serve out the remain-
der of the term (as vice presidents do now), or an additional reform 
could require that the successor serve only until an election could be 
held. 
The Secretary of State was the designated successor in the event of 
a double vacancy from 1886 to 1947, and is still a potential successor 
under current law. Secretaries of State would have at least as much 
executive experience as vice presidents and more experience in foreign 
affairs (an area of increasing importance to presidents). There would be 
numerous questions surrounding the special election procedures, but this 
is merely an additional suggested reform. A less drastic change would be 
to simply switch the vice presidential duties to the Secretary of State. 
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Someone other than Secretary of State could be named as the immedi-
ate successor, such as the highest ranking Congressman of the same party 
as the outgoing president. Another proposal would be to require the 
president 1 s party in each house of Congress to elect, in January of the 
first session, a designated successor. A law could then specify one as 
the immediate successor and the other as successor in the event of a 
double vacancy. This would approximate the selection of a prime minister 
in a parliamentary system. 
The above mentioned reforms would remedy some of the flaws created 
by the development of the vice presidency. They are not flawless. The 
vice presidency 1 s flaws are so severe the office no longer lives up to 
the justifications for its retention. 
NOTE 
I Robert DiCierico, The American President, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., 1983), pp. 8-9. 
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